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Introduction 
       
On September 11, 2009 The New York Times reported that the robust South Korean  
economy would be adding another commodity to its export roster: the Korean alphabet.   
A retired South Korean millionaire real estate magnate by the name of Lee Ki-nam, under  
the banner of her self-created Hunminchŏngŭm Society, led a delegation to the remote  
town of Baubau on Boton Island, Indonesia in July 2008 with the expressed purpose of  
“doing for the world’s non-written languages what Doctor’s Without Borders is doing in  
medicine.”1   Kim Chu-wŏn, linguist at Seoul National University and President of the  
Hunminchŏngŭm Society, summarizes their mission as one to save unwritten languages  
from extinction and thus “ensure mankind’s linguistic and cultural diversity.”2 Following  
a meeting with tribal chieftains of the Cia-Cia people—a minority of 60,000 people in  
Indonesia—an agreement was brokered including a plan for the creation of a writing  
system and Han’gŭl-based textbooks so that the Cia-Cia people could teach their  
children their own language in school.3  Lee Ki-nam also offered to build a $500,000  
Korean cultural center and promote economic development.  Though the initial  
establishment of this program was among a modest-sized group of 50 children, Lee Ki- 
nam made clear her ambitions to spread the Korean script to all of the world’s non- 
written languages, citing an almost sacred motivation to fulfill the will of her direct  
ancestor and creator of Han’gŭl, King Sejong.4   
      As the Hunminchŏngŭm Society was announcing its first successes in promoting  
global cultural diversity and linguistic ecology amid domestic praise and support, these  
same actions were raising concerns among certain other groups for a variety of reasons.   
A number of Muslim countries had been raising alarms in connection with South Korea’s  
	   2	  
zeal in promoting Christianity, and Lee Ki-nam’s past associations with missionary  
groups in her failed attempts to spread Han’gŭl among minorities in Nepal, Mongolia,  
Vietnam, and China did little to allay these fears.5 The Indonesian government for its part  
viewed the adoption of Han’gŭl or any other script as a potential threat to its policy of  
promoting a “language of unity” (meaning Bahasa Indonesian in the Roman script) to  
encourage effective communication among various ethnic groups.  It feared that the  
official adoption of Han’gŭl by minority ethnic groups would not only further isolate the  
Cia-Cia people from the Indonesian state, but might also trigger a “messy” situation in  
which other minority groups would be encouraged to invite their own foreign countries  
for linguistic assistance.6  The Indonesian government’s tepid response to the program  
compounded by the complex legal issues surrounding Han’gŭl’s official adoption by  
even a relatively small minority group foreshadowed the uphill battle that Lee Ki-nam  
and her Society could face in their mission to reach thousands of geographically,  
economically, and religiously disparate, pre-literate populations.7  Furthermore, though  
Hunminchŏngŭm Society president Kim Chu-wŏn made a clear distinction between the  
refuted exportation and globalization of Han’gŭl and the Korean language and the  
Society’s professed goal of preservation of indigenous languages, some critics   
nevertheless suspected a form of linguistic imperialism.8   
     To some observers, this was a banal affair, a mildly amusing footnote to increasingly 
commonplace instances of globalization and cross-cultural interaction involving distant, 
obscure actors.  However, considering the tumultuous modern history of the Korean 
language and the pressing issue of language extinction, this event is striking in illustrating 
just how far the Korean language has come.  In addition, this story illuminates the 
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particular Korean experience with language in the twentieth century, providing an 
intriguing insight into the enduring effects of religion, Confucian tradition, theories of 
modernization, and nationalism on the development, character, and perception of the 
Korean language.  Furthermore, this case effectively encapsulates several contentious 
issues in recent socio-linguistic inquiry, including script nationalism, language policy, 
linguistic ideology, and linguistic imperialism.       
     The Korean language today boasts over 70 million speakers, ranking thirteenth in the 
world above the number of Italian and even French first-language speakers.9 The 
illiteracy rate in South Korea is among the lowest in the world—effectively zero—and 
the position and status of the language among peninsular Koreans is considered by 
linguists to be secure and in negligible threat of extinction or even considerable 
diminution.10 Koreans display a patriotism and pride, almost a reverence toward their 
language seldomly exhibited by other language speakers.  Countless language-related 
organizations exist on the Korean peninsula and among Korean communities across the 
world, groups variously focusing on the codification, purification, protection, and 
promotion of the Korean language.11 However, the linguistic situation on the Korean 
peninsula at the turn of the twentieth century was fundamentally different.  Indeed, as of 
the 1890’s it was not at all clear whether the Korean script (Han’gŭl) would even be 
accorded any kind of official status or important role in the emerging modern state. In  
the midst of Japanese total war of the mid-1940’s, oppressive assimilation policies 
threatened the very existence of the Korean language and identity itself.  Since liberation 
however, the Korean language has been revived through its status as language of 
instruction in universal education, and South Korea has witnessed a fitful yet pronounced 
	   4	  
decline in the use of Chinese characters in favor of native Han’gŭl, while the North has 
done away with Chinese characters in education and official publications completely.12          
And far from fighting for survival, the Korean script is now on the verge of international 
export.  What happened, then, to resurrect Han’gŭl from the realm of obscurity and the 
depths of mockery? How was this reviled tool of Buddhists and women revived and 
elevated to a symbol of the independent Korean nation?  How did a downgraded, 
subordinated, out-lawed language eventually come to inspire a millionaire real estate 
mogul to exhaust personal resources in a nationalistic quest for Korean promotion?      
     Lee Ki-nam and the Hunimnchŏngŭm Society expressed clearly their intentions in the 
internationalization of Han’gŭl, that is the conservation of linguistic and cultural diversity 
through the provision of a script to contain a spoken language.13 This innocuous, even 
altruistic goal to preserve traditional languages threatened by modern forces through the 
provision of a ‘modern’ phonetic writing system nevertheless embodies several recurring 
themes in the modern Korean language experience, some of which bear a slightly 
disturbing resemblance to Japanese colonial discourse and may indeed represent a sort of 
post-colonial consciousness.  Hunminchŏngŭm Society president Kim Chu-wŏn has 
conflated the goals of his group with the actions undertaken globally by (largely faith-
based) linguists to preserve non-written language through Roman script provision, while 
Lee Ki-nam’s association with missionary groups in previous campaigns further invokes 
a religious tone to the program and parallels remarkably the strong influence of 
Christianity in the development of modern Korean.  Lee’s allusion to King Sejong as a 
source of pride and an inspiration in her quest similarly harkens back to analogous 
entreaties in the popular press during the early period of Han’gŭl promotion.  Employing 
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a common rhetorical device of the time, reform-minded nationalists would invoke 
traditional Confucian notions of piety toward the King in order to promote a forward-
looking nationalist agenda, in this case questioning how a loyal Confucian subject could 
refuse the sincere gift of his master.  While the official line from President Kim has been 
one of humanitarianism disconnected from nationalist interests, effusive press reaction 
and statements from Lee elsewhere have suggested a more nationalistic intention.14 The 
promise to construct a $500,000 Korean language and culture center, Lee’s professed 
goal of bringing Han’gŭl to all the world’s non-written languages, and a political party’s 
claims that Lee’s efforts were “a heroic first step towards globalizing Han’gŭl” have 
infused a supposedly humanitarian endeavor with nationalistic fervor, again recalling 
similar nationalistic motivations for Han’gŭl promotion from the early twentieth century 
and reproducing a form of Japanese colonial discourse on language internationalization.15  
By promoting the international diffusion of a language or a script based on conscious 
nationalistic pride but more significantly on the belief of a superior/inferior dichotomy 
between languages—in this case written and non-written languages—the Society’s 
actions run the risk of replicating a form of cultural and linguistic imperialism.  However 
altruistic the stated goals of the Hunminchŏngŭm Society, language exportation 
conceived in a crucible of intense linguistic nationalism and perceived superiority/ 
inferiority peppered with the familiar ‘civilizing mission’ rhetoric bent on saving 
imperiled cultures is pervaded by a somewhat troubling discursive strand from recent 
Korean history.                           
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Part 1. Theorizing the Linguistic: A Reconceived View of 
Language in the Korean Context 
 
 
1.1 Language and Power 
 
          Integration into a single ‘linguistic community’, which is a product of the political     
          domination that is endlessly reproduced by institutions capable of imposing universal   
          recognition of the dominant language, is the condition for the establishment of relations of       
          linguistic domination.16 
 
Few concepts are as fundamentally intrinsic to the fabric of the human experience and yet 
as poorly understood as the concept of language.  While providing the foundation of 
human culture and thought, the formal study of language as a legitimate academic field 
dates back only to the late 19th century, with the seeds of more rigorous socio-linguistic 
inquiry being planted even more recently.  Language is at once everything and nothing—
the very foundation of our human existence by virtue of its virtual universality, while 
often overlooked or simply forgotten due to this same universality.  In the words of 
Auguste Comte, “Language forms a kind of wealth, which all can make use of at once 
without causing any diminution of the store, and which thus admits a complete 
community of enjoyment; for all, freely participating in the general treasure, 
unconsciously aid in its preservation.”17 This conception of language as a ‘communal 
treasure’, however, fails to recognize two important points: there is more than one 
treasure, and each treasure is not created equally.  Though universal, languages are 
assigned disproportionate values in social contexts based on their relations to (or 
hierarchical distance from) socially legitimized, official languages.  In a society divided 
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into classes, this value is distributed unequally among various usages of a single 
language, whereas in a bi/multi-lingual situation, one language is favored over others as 
the sole, ‘official language.’  In a colonial context, exaggerated inequality reinforced 
through distorted social hierarchy and the imposition of biased language policies 
exacerbates linguistic domination and leads to pronounced disenfranchisement and 
dispossession.  From a critical socio-linguistic perspective, a portion of this research aims 
to investigate and demonstrate the importance of language in terms of linguistic 
domination, modernization, and symbolic power within the context of early 20th century 
Korea.18 
     The examination of language within this particular Korean context is especially 
intriguing for several reasons.  First, the Korean language’s variable statuses as a minor, 
subjugated, suppressed, and even banned language during various periods of its existence 
create not only a complex, engaging field of inquiry but also confer upon the language a 
sense of indispensability and relevance to the Korean experience, a sense which is often 
muted in the historical circumstances of major languages such as English.  Populous, 
influential countries speaking well-established languages lacking a history of threat of 
linguistic annihilation can easily overlook the role of language in historical national 
development due to its perceived innocuousness or banality.  The ongoing debates over 
language purification and the oscillating government hanja policies in post-liberation 
North and South Korea, as well as violent clashes over language policy in India and 
certain post-colonial African nations further demonstrate the possible intensifying effects 
of colonialism on the language situation.19 This is not to suggest that the issue of 
language is absent from historiography, nor that Korea is a completely unique linguistic 
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case.20 The issue of language has been receiving more attention in scholarship on Korea, 
but this is a recent phenomenon.  When language is considered, it is usually accorded a 
minor role in history, most often being discussed in conjunction with education or 
literacy.  However, what this research intends to do is demonstrate the primacy of 
language in developing and symbolizing modern Korea, a country that, while not unique 
in its linguistic history, nevertheless represents a counterexample to countries with 
widely-spoken languages, as well as a rare post-colonial success story in native language 
retention throughout society.21      
     A second reason that I call attention to the language issue in modern Korean history is 
due to the specific conditions under which modern Korean came to be developed and 
standardized.  Relatively speaking, the reform and standardization of Korean into the 
form that is known today was a quite recent phenomenon, born out of a sense of 
necessity.  The contemporary shape of the Korean language is the direct result of 
concerted, conscious efforts on the part of a broad swath of Korean society, including 
nationalists, communists, Japanese government officials, linguists, grammarians, and 
teachers, over a mere handful of decades.  Much like that of Japanese, Korean language 
reform and promotion—periodically more or less mutually reinforcing phenomena—
resulted from perceived domestic and foreign threats to the integrity and the future of the 
language, the nation, and the nation embodied in and symbolized by the language.  To a 
higher degree than that of many languages, the modern history of the Korean language 
bears the marks of intense, conscious public and private intervention, and the language’s 
experience with such hyper-intervention during an extremely compressed period—a 
period marked by an uncharacteristically rapid influx of new and competing ideologies—
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creates a sort of microcosm of history in which both the role of language in society and 
the effects of these competing ideologies on language were greatly amplified. 
     A third reason for my decision to examine language in modern Korean history is due 
to the peculiar linguistic situation in East Asia and the crisis of modernity that it 
engendered.  With the intensification of Euro-American influence in East Asia in the 19th 
century came new conceptions of knowledge and in effect a shift in the perceived 
language of legitimacy.  Countries within the Chinese character sphere of influence—
including of course China as well as Japan and Korea—were faced with the pressing 
matter of linguistic reform intrinsically tied to the nature of knowledge itself, specifically 
the question of which knowledge was relevant to the ‘modern’ state as exemplified by the 
European model.  Chinese characters were traditionally viewed as the direct link to ‘true’ 
knowledge of the sages, but this knowledge itself was increasingly coming under attack 
as irrelevant and indeed antithetical to the formation of the modern nation.  As a country 
which had for centuries been dominated intellectually by a tiny elite literati steeped in the 
Chinese classics alone with very high illiteracy ruled by pronounced, entrenched 
hierarchical reproduction reinforced by limited mobility and access to power determined 
almost exclusively by language (classical Chinese) ability, the situation for Korea was 
especially acute.  This severe case of linguistic diglossia heightened the sense of urgency 
among many early Korean reformers, a situation complicated by the later advent of 
colonialism when the traditionalists’ previous promotion of Chinese characters (hanja) as 
the source of Confucian truth took on a collaborationist connotation when viewed against 
the backdrop of the now forceful imposition of Japanese and its prominent utilization of 
Chinese characters.22 Therefore, Korea’s abrupt encounter with modernization, its 
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position between two empires utilizing numerically widespread yet epistemologically 
threatened languages, and its extreme diglossic condition exacerbated by low literacy and 
relative dissimilarity between the dichotomous linguistic elements (Chinese writing and 
spoken Korean) combined to create a linguistic scenario uncharacteristic of many other 
nations.  Again, this is not an argument for Korean exceptionalism based on a singular 
linguistic experience, as all language groups have undergone some form of turmoil 
related to language, especially during the modernization process.  However, the 
conditions noted above coupled with the sheer speed of the language reform process 
combined to produce a linguistic history that was atypical, if not rare.  Though Romance 
languages may trace their origins to Latin or Greek much the way East Asian languages 
do to Classical Chinese, none have experienced such a dramatic collision with practically 
forced language reform, nor do these languages exhibit the extreme grammatical and 
graphical dissimilarities that exist between Classical Chinese, Korean, and the Korean 
indigenous script (Han’gŭl).    
      Though I emphasize the relevance and immediacy of the Korean language in early  
modern Korea due to the above historical circumstances, Korean nevertheless  
shares a common bond with all modes of communication, and that is its intimate  
relationship with power.   In a bi/multi-lingual situation, one language is favored over  
others as the sole legitimate language, or, a language which Pierre Bourdieu defines as  
having  “benefited from the institutional conditions necessary for its generalized  
codification and imposition,” which is “known and recognized more or less completely  
throughout the whole jurisdiction of a certain political authority.”23 These “institutional  
conditions” refer to the generally unconscious collusion of various actors in the language  
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legitimation process, actors that include but are by no means limited to dictionary  
compilers, grammarians, politicians, the media, and teachers.  In particular, the dialectical  
relationship between the unification of the educational (and linguistic) market, linked to  
the introduction of educational qualifications as a precondition for upward mobility in the  
job market succeeds in monopolizing access to the labor market and cementing the status  
of the legitimate language.  Therefore, the educational system plays a decisive role in 
legitimation of a single language while simultaneously inducing minority language users  
to “collaborate in the destruction of their instruments of expression.”24 Bourdieu writes  
the following on the centrality of the educational system in language legitimization: “The  
position which the educational system gives to the different languages (or the different  
cultural contents) is such an important issue only because this institution has the  
monopoly in the large-scale production of producers/consumers, and therefore in the  
reproduction of the market without which the social value of the linguistic competence,  
its capacity to function as linguistic capital, would cease to exist.”25  
      The dominant role of education both in the discourse on Korean language and as the 
site of market monopolization and subsequent social reproduction is critical in 
understanding the Korean situation.  As is the case with every society, though various 
actors exerted influence in the legitimization of a certain language at different times, the 
theme of education was most prominent in the explicit discourses on language/Korean 
script promotion, while the educational system in Korea was fundamental in maintaining 
centuries of elite inculcation in the Chinese Classics, contributing to the reproduction of a 
system granting the elite near-exclusive power via its monopolization of government 
authority connected to the government service examination (based on knowledge of the 
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legitimate language).  During the colonial period, the educational system endeavored to 
indoctrinate the population in the Japanese language reinforced by a labor market 
increasingly requiring educational qualifications earned from Japanese schools in the 
legitimized and newly state-sanctioned official language, Japanese.  In this way, 
education was the self-reinforcing linchpin of Korean social reproduction; it monopolized 
the large-scale production of producers/consumers who drove the market without which 
the linguistic competence it was predicated upon would cease to exist.  As we shall see, 
in the early 20th century, classical Chinese lost its position as the legitimate language in 
Korea precisely because its monopolization of the market through large-scale production 
of producers/consumers was compromised.  In its place, certain reformers promoted 
vernacular Korean language utilizing Han’gŭl, justifying its usage through recourse to the 
shifting knowledge market, embodied in modern education.  Finally, though Japanese was 
designated the official (state) language not through the educational system per se but 
through a top-down edict issued by the Governor General, the crucial component to the 
mass legitimization of Japanese was again the educational system by virtue of its 
monopolization of the labor market.26 Though coercive means (of varying intensities 
during different periods of colonial rule) were employed by the Japanese authority to 
forcefully impose the Japanese language, I argue that a much more effective method of 
control lie in the habitus among Koreans engendered by Japanese’s control of the labor 
market.27 This theme of language and power functions as an ongoing theoretical thread, a 




1.2. Defining the Terminology: Han’gŭl, Ŏnmun, Kukŏ and Kokugo 
 
From the beginning of the campaign to propagate Han’gŭl internationally, Hunmin 
chŏngŭm President Kim Chu-wŏn reiterated the humanitarian nature of the organization’s 
goals by drawing a clear distinction between Han’gŭl and the Korean language.  He 
claimed that Han’gŭl and the Korean language were separate, and that the organization’s 
intent to provide a way to contain a pre-literate language were commensurate with King 
Sejong’s original invention of the script and were in no way connected to the Korean 
spoken language.28 Kim’s distinction between Korean language and script seems to be a 
natural, logical separation, not even warranting comment.  To take Romance languages as 
an example, dozens of languages can be counted as “sharing” the Roman alphabet with 
no one language claiming any privileged status or unique bond to the script, while several 
languages have adopted the Roman script in a context relatively divorced from 
nationalistic affinity to the West.29 However, a closer examination of the particular 
historical relationship between the Korean language and the Korean script complicates 
Kim’s statements by revealing several important contrasts between Korean and many 
other languages as well as an exceptional nationalistic tone throughout.  President Kim’s 
repeated attempts in the press to justify the righteousness of the Society’s mission by 
reiterating a language/script dichotomy further suggest a growing perception that possibly 
widespread nationalistic undertones surrounding the issue needed to be downplayed.  
Furthermore, a brief inquiry into the modern history of the Korean language will help to 
explain the intimate linguistic-nationalism connection within the East-Asia language and 
cultural sphere. 
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    The history of the Korean language since the turn of the 20th century has been a history 
characterized by precarious and fluctuating Korean statuses, standardization during a 
highly compressed and complex period, and a particularly intense level of linguistic 
influence from neighboring languages.  Whereas these particular circumstances have 
combined to produce a considerable historical complexity, they have also resulted in a 
bewildering jumble of linguistic terminologies, meanings, connotations and nuances.  
Below I briefly explore the relevant connections between the Korean script and language, 
introduce the philosophy of ‘national language’ and its discursive evolution between 
Japan and Korea, and delineate and define the various linguistic terminologies as they are 
to be employed in the remainder of the paper. 
     A short sample of the wide range of extant terminologies relating to the Korean 
language will suffice to convey a sense of the degree of complexity involved.  The 
following is a non-exhaustive list of various terms which have come to denote the Korean 
script (Han’gŭl) since its inception: 
 
 
-Hunminchŏngŭm (訓民正音)                                Original name upon promulgation,  
                                                                          correct sounds for instruction of the people                                                                                                                      
-Chŏngŭm           (正       音)                                                  Correct sounds 
-Ŏnmun               (諺       文)                                           Vulgar language/writing  
-Amkŭl                                                                                     Female script 
-Ponmun              (本      文 )                                                   One’s writing 
-Amun                 ( 我      文)                                                     Our writing 
-Kukmun             (國       文)                                                  National writing 
-Urikul                                                                                        Our script 
-Chosŏn kul                                                                              Chosŏn script 
-Hankuk kul                                                                               Korea script 
-Hanja                 (韓       字)                                                   Korea characters 
-Kakya kul                                                                                ‘A-B-C’ script 
-Chosŏn mun        (朝 鮮 文)                                                    Chosŏn writing 
-Ach’im kul                                                                              Morning script30 
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-Han’gŭl                                                                                  The great script31 
 
 
This dizzying array of names for a single script suggests not so much a lack of agreement 
over which term would be used, but rather reflects the tone of discourse on Han’gŭl, both 
positive and negative.  As may be inferred from some of the above terms, a battle was 
waged over the future of Han’gŭl.  The positive connotations conveyed by some of the 
terms above—correct sounds invoking loyalty to King Sejong or the aggrandizing great 
script—signify conscious efforts to promote Han’gŭl, while the negative implications 
conveyed by the terms ŏnmun, amkŭl (referring to the script’s perceived concentration 
among women) and ach’im kul (due to its ease of learning) reflect attempts to disparage 
the script in favor of classical Chinese and in turn vested interests.  In the popular press, 
the choice as to which term would be employed was an overtly political one; certain of 
the terms could signify quite clearly the ideological leanings of the author.   Moreover, 
the general shift over time from the use of overwhelmingly hostile terms to a gradually 
more laudatory tone paralleled a popular attitude change toward Han’gŭl and revealed a 
growing trend of anti-conservatism, at least among literate commentators featured in the 
print press.  This is not to suggest, however, that a clear historical progression unfolded, 
each period being clearly delineated by a single in-vogue term.  Several different names 
for Han’gŭl were commonly used during any one period, and many authors actually 
referred to Han’gŭl by disparate names within a single piece.   The terminology employed 
more often reflected the author’s position within the debate rather than the date of 
authorship.   
     Here, the generally accepted term Han’gŭl is used in reference to the Korean script 
alone, as well as in reference to the script and vernacular Korean as the two are so 
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intimately connected.  On the other hand, the usage of the contemporary term ‘Korean’ 
(hankugŏ/ hankukmal) may refer to any one of the historical manifestations of the Korean 
language in both spoken and written form, including pre-standardized pure Han’gŭl, 
Sino-Korean mixed script, and virtually desinified contemporary Korean.32  ‘Korean’ will 
additionally encompass the Korean script, except where explicit delineation is required.  
Finally, a special effort is needed to extract the terms ‘state language’ and ‘state writing’ 
(kugŏ and kukmun) from the terminology jumble and treat them in an individual fashion 
due to their ideological implications, an issue taken up below. 
 
 
The State, Language, and the Case of ‘Round Trip Terms’ 
 
The concept of national languages is an issue garnering increased attention in the field of 
socio-linguistics.  This is a subject with a wide array of theoretical implications, 
including conceptions of modernity, language and power, and language ideology.  Due to 
the politically charged nature of this phenomenon as well as the somewhat confusing and 
convoluted evolution of the idea in Korea, the terminology surrounding ‘national 
language’ in the East Asian context requires clarification.  In her nuanced work on the 
Japanese language question entitled “The Ideology of Kokugo,” Lee Yŏn suk claims that, 
although existing before the Meiji Era, “kokugo (kugŏ) with a modern connotation, used 
in opposition to kango (Chinese) in its modern sense, was a child of modernity born out 
of the intense determination of Meiji Japan.”33 The term with its altered connotations was 
then re-circulated through East Asia and adapted to local conditions.  In this way, kugŏ 
and other modern reformulations of Chinese-derived base concepts can be theorized as 
‘round-trip terms,’ beginning as certain classical Chinese character with prescribed, 
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codified usages, mixing first in Japan with Western conceptions of modernity before 
finally returning to their origin in China with new meanings affixed, their recent origins 
obscured by the ancient component parts (國  語).  Andre Schmid detects a similar 
pattern in the development of the term minjok (民 族), a term whose component parts 
were used separately for centuries but were never specifically combined until late 19th 
century Japan.34 Schmid writes that “two venerable characters traditionally used to denote 
various types of social groups…served to blur the term’s recent origins, suggesting an 
etymology that, like the claims being made for the nation, stretched into the distant 
past.”35 The ancient origin of the characters constituting kugŏ similarly lent an air of 
historical legitimacy to the term, though the concept of this particular kuk (國) was a 
reconceived, Western conception of the nation as it related to language.  Schmid further 
notes that the neologism minjok continued to shift its meaning through discursive 
interaction in East Asia, first being used in Korean print in conjunction with “eastern” 
(tongbang) and “white” (baegin) to describe a social-Darwinian scheme of competing 
races before losing all Pan-Asian implications and coming to refer only to Korean 
people.36 In a similar fashion, after its initial semantic reconfiguration in Japan, the term 
kugŏ continued to transform and evolve throughout East Asia over time, eventually 
taking on controversial political and ideological dimensions during colonial Korea as the 
meaning of the term became contested terrain.   
     From the second half of the 19th century up until the Japanese annexation of Korea in 
1910, the term kugŏ—with its newly-affixed connotation of one nation’s language in 
opposition to others—was increasingly being employed in Japan and Korea to refer to the 
respective languages.  However, with the advent of colonialism and the restructuring of 
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language policy on the Korean peninsula, the understanding of kugŏ/kokugo was 
problematized.  In fact, the very definition of the term was contested along nationalistic 
lines, with the ideology of kugŏ as conceived in the minds of the various actors coming to 
symbolize competing versions of nation.  In 1911, Japanese was declared the national 
language (kugŏ) of Korea, indicating that on the most obvious level government 
administration and Japanese education would be conducted in Japanese (kokugo).  This 
conceals, however, the wide-ranging, long-term implications for the whole of Korean 
society due to the intimate relationship between official language competency and the 
labor market. With this proclamation, the kokugo which had previously referred only to 
the indigenous national language of Japan was now transplanted semantically intact (國 
語) to a foreign country, while the kugŏ status of Korean was now demoted to that of 
“Chōsengo” (朝鮮語).37 What complicated matters even further was that language reform 
had been proceeding in a parallel fashion in Japan and Korea both before and after 
annexation, and that Japan was far from settling its own complex linguistic situation—
both technically and philosophically—upon annexation and implementation of kokugo 
policies in Korea.  This meant that the ideological connotations associated with 
kokugo/kugŏ and hence the future meaning of the word continued to evolve and 
transform in each of the countries, existing in a dynamic of mutual influence and 
reconfiguration.  In this way, the evolving definition and ideological implications of 
kokugo/kugŏ were the results of a dialectical Japan-Korea relationship.  Though many 
scholars have claimed a leadership role for Japan in colonial modernization projects due 
to the country’s relatively advanced state in East Asia, I argue that the more or less 
parallel standardization and modernization of Japanese and Korean provided a 
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particularly noteworthy basis for an interactive, cross-penetrating dialectic, with neither 
country taking the definitive lead despite Japan’s de facto advantage due to its colonial 
governing apparatus and virtual labor market monopolization .  Importantly, the Japanese 
language (kokugo) was never conferred widespread legitimacy as the official language by 
many Korean nationalist reformers, due in part to the perceived progress being made in 
Korean language standardization and thanks to increasingly nationalistic kugŏ 
connotations resulting paradoxically from kukogo ideological influence.  Despite the 
perceived illegitimacy of Japanese as kokugo, the ultimate dislodging of Japanese could 
not occur until the colonial system perpetuating its superior status through connection to 
social mobility was removed.    
      The various terminologies denoting Korean script and language in the early 20th 
century were far from merely semantic labels.  They were contested terrains, sites of 
discursive warfare in which competing future versions of the Korean nation embodied in 
language battled for ascendency.  Just as competing discourses on Han’gŭl employing 
positive and negative terminologies reflected the attitudes toward the script while 
simultaneously defining its continuing development and role in the nation, evolving and 
competing conceptions of national language helped to define not only which language 
would occupy this position but the nature of this position and its role in the future of the 
nation.  The reader should keep in mind the significance of these terminologies in the 
following sections, where I explore shifting discourses on Korean and Han’gŭl in the 
popular press.  I now turn my attention to a brief overview of some specific theorizations 
of language in the early Korean Enlightenment period.  
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1.3. Language, Civilization and Enlightenment 
At the turn of the 20th century, the watchwords of the new Korean intellectual were  
undoubtedly munmyŏng kaehwa (civilization and enlightenment).  This new intellectual  
class spearheaded a nationalist movement that championed the vanguard Western  
modernist epistemology as the driving force for the emerging Korean ‘nation.’  As Andre  
Schmid points out, “the power and seductiveness of munmyŏng kaehwa lay in its ability  
to link seamlessly the individual, nation, and globe into a historical and spatial unity.”38  
Schmid writes the following on the universality and revolutionary nature of munmyŏng  
kaehwa: “As a modern discourse par excellence, munmyŏng kaehwa offered a conceptual  
framework in which various groups could come to terms with their recent integration into  
the global capitalist system.  At the same time, its underlying drive for change served to  
deepen that participation….nationalism was the vehicle for accelerating the peninsula’s  
inclusion in the global capitalist order, and these globalizing forces—in particular what  
was called ‘new knowledge’ (sinhak)—stimulated a radical rethinking of the nation and  
its identity.”39  
     At the heart of this discourse on “new knowledge” lay the issue of language, in 
particular the debate over script.  This discussion—played out in the pages of the newly 
emerging popular press—concerned not merely issues of orthography and grammar, but 
the very conception of modern, legitimate knowledge itself.  On either side of the debate 
were the traditional Confucian yangban elite and their supporters and a new breed of 
educated nationalist reformers.40 Defending Korea’s tradition of reverence for the classics 
of Chinese literature and their own class’s continued inculcation in such knowledge, the 
yangban argued for the continued usage of Chinese characters while disparaging so-
called ŏnmun (vulgar script).  These traditionalists claimed that Chinese writing (Hanmun) 
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was the ‘true script’ (chinmun) that granted exclusive access to true knowledge, whereas 
Han’gŭl could claim no such special access to truth.  On the other side of the debate, 
nationalist reformers attacked Chinese writing on several fronts; they argued that its level 
of difficulty precluded the lower classes from attaining it, they disparaged the language as 
a foreign element in their attempts to promote all things Korean, and they pointed out the 
poor fit between Chinese and Korean grammar and syntax.  However, their most 
revolutionary and persuasive argument attacked hanmun’s claim to sole legitimacy in the 
conveyance of knowledge.  In effect, these reformers were questioning the entire 
epistemological structure of East Asia from the platform of munmyŏng kaehwa based on 
a universalized Western conception of modernization.  The speed with which the tide 
turned in favor of the reformers was remarkable.  After centuries of classical Chinese 
education of a restrictive nature in the hands of a tiny literati, the debate on Korean script 
had placed hanmun advocates on the defensive within a single generation. Whereas in the 
early 1890’s promoting the abolition of hanmun and the exclusive usage of Han’gŭl 
would have been met by derision, laughter, or worse, by the first decade of the 20th 
century the discourse had shifted to the point where the most conservative elements were 
arguing only for the usage of mixed Sino-Korean script (kukhanmun), while progressive 
reformers called for the complete abolition of hanmun.41 Han’gŭl thus solidified its 
position in the modern Korean nation. 
     How did a previously disparaged script gain such prominence within such a short 
period of time?  How did reformers succeed in elevating the status of Han’gŭl to a 
nationally recognized, legitimate script when hanmun had occupied the position of 
legitimate language and contributed to centuries of social reproduction through 
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monopolization of the feudal administrative power structure?  Although the particular 
make-up of late-Chosŏn society was ripe for reform, nationalist reformers adroitly 
exploited this opportunity by successfully critiquing, reconceptualizing, and reforming 
traditional knowledge through recourse to munmyŏng kaehwa.  In promoting Han’gŭl for 
the nation, reformers connected Korea to the globalizing forces engendered in munmyŏng 
kaehwa by intimately linking the Korean script to “new knowledge.”  Below, I analyze 
the ideology of munmyŏng kaehwa and its utilization in editorials of the popular press, 
paying close attention to the connection between Han’gŭl and conceptions of “new 
knowledge.” Munmyŏng kaehwa provided the earliest theoretical underpinnings of a 
modernizing Korean state, a sort of nationalist philosophical base for the transition from 
the Chosŏn Dynasty through the Great Han Empire period up until the colonial period.  
After this time, the discourse on munmyŏng kaehwa in the popular press gradually 
transformed while a more mature, focused discourse on specific avenues of language 
reform—including reorganization, standardization, and dictionary compilation—began to 
take shape.  This discourse was often framed as an appeal for modern, vernacular 
education, not as a path toward munmyŏng kaehwa per se, but as a nationalistic response 
to the colonial modernity paradigm.  It was this nationalistic discourse that succeeded 
munmyŏng kaehwa in defining the course of the Korean nation in relation to the Korean 
language during the colonial period, and it is where we now turn in our discussion.                                     
 
1.4 Language and Nationalism 
 
The concept of national language emerged some centuries ago, yet its received meaning 
and significance has begun to be questioned in the field of socio-linguistics only since the 
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late 20th century.  Following Emerson, Florian Coulmas outlines nationalism as it relates 
to language in a technical sense by which it is often understood today, describing it as a 
force that “created unity across societal strata whose coming into existence was thus 
intimately related to the transformation of feudal into bourgeois societies which, in turn, 
depended on the expansion of secular education in the vernacular languages.”42 This 
generated the idea of “a natural unity of nation, state, and language,” an idea which is 
often conceived as an outgrowth of the French Revolution, as the full vigor of the nation 
state was only realized after this event.43 Therefore, in this conception of nationalism, 
unity across social strata was dependent upon vernacular education, placing the school 
and specifically language at the center of the emerging nation-state philosophy.  Indeed, 
the modern (European) nation could not have existed without a preceding language to 
which a majority adhered and recognized as its own. 
    How, then, did languages come to command this adherence and recognition?  Does the 
vernacular education system completely explain the proliferation of a standardized 
language and a population’s eventual acceptance of it as the national language?  Benedict 
Anderson has famously postulated the centrality not of vernacular education, but rather 
print capitalism in the creation of so-called “imagined communities.”44 According to 
Anderson, “the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the fatal diversity of 
human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined community, which in 
its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation.”45 The possibility of imagining 
the nation only arose historically when several “fundamental cultural conceptions…lost 
their axiomatic grip on men’s minds.”46 The first conception, and the one of relevance to 
our discussion here, was the idea that “a particular script-language offered privileged 
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access to ontological truth, precisely because it was an inseparable part of that truth.”47 
Therefore, a loosening of the ties binding script, language and truth across vast 
populations in part gave way to new possibilities for imagining communities along 
reconceived linguistic lines.  Awareness of these linguistic connections and subsequent 
coalescence around them as recognized national languages was precipitated by the spread 
of print capitalism. 
     In the case of Korea, while print capitalism did contribute to the possibility of a new 
form of imagined community through the dissemination of vernacular press, it is not clear 
whether print capitalism was the decisive factor in legitimizing and promulgating Korean 
as national language, or whether vernacular print media even preceded chronologically 
the imagined community in Korea.  Several interrelated factors contributed to the 
legitimization of Korean as national language, including vernacular education, Korean’s 
position vis-à-vis the labor market, and print capitalism, while Korean historical 
circumstances complicate Anderson’s basically Euro-centric claim that language 
popularization preceded imagination which then begot the nation state in a neat 
chronological progression.   
     Anderson correctly argues that a major precursor to the rise of nationalism was the 
demotion of certain script-languages, such as Latin, Arabic, and Chinese, from arbiter of 
absolute truth to irrelevant or unnecessary language.  This is precisely what nationalist 
reformers attempted and largely succeeded in doing through the Korean print press and 
other outlets.  These reformers did not attack the claim that Chinese symbols enjoyed an 
exclusive link to true knowledge per se, but rather questioned the relevance of this ‘truth’ 
to the modern nation.  Significantly, however, the popular press in which these arguments 
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were made appeared only after or roughly in tandem with the first stirrings of modern 
nationalism (imagined community sentiment?), and even then the press was circulated 
only among a tiny coterie of literate intellectuals.  Korea’s highly concentrated classical 
(Chinese) education coupled with widespread illiteracy at the end of the 19th century 
therefore precluded a European-style progression from print capitalism to imagined 
community to nation, while the roughly simultaneous emergence of the accouterments of 
modernity (vernacular press, modern education, national consciousness) in a compressed 
period created an environment of parallel development, interconnectivity, and mutual 
influence.  Vernacular Korean disseminated through print culture did not actualize an 
imagined community which provided the foundation for the nation-state in a systematic, 
orderly fashion.  Rather, the Korean language was constantly evolving both linguistically 
and hierarchically in relation to other languages, the press, nationalism, and the education 
system, which affected the trajectory of the Korean nation.  Chinese characters exerted a 
powerful influence on the Korean language in the early 20th century, which in turn 
affected the readership and content of the popular press, as well as its impact on shaping 
national consciousness.  During the colonial period, another sort of exclusivity and 
hierarchical social reproduction was extended through legitimization of the Japanese 
press and limiting, censoring or banning the Korean press, further affecting the Korean 
language and script and their impact on developing imagined community potentiality.  
Finally, the Korean language and the emerging education system existed in a dialectical 
relationship, where each actor was both influencing and influenced by each other through 
constant evolution and interaction with a broader social complexity.          
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     In this complex social environment of multilingualism, contested modernity, and 
epistemological compression, it is difficult to determine exactly what factor contributed 
most substantially to the establishment of a national language in Korea and what this 
meant in turn for the Korean nation.  Indeed, the very concept of national language in 
Korea was a contested terrain, where classical Chinese, Japanese, and Korean 
periodically vied for supremacy.  It seems clear, however, that we are not dealing with a 
clean cause and effect relationship between language, print capitalism, the imagined 
community, and education.  Although all of these factors inevitably influenced the shape 
and character of language and its relationship to the Korean nation in the first half of the 
20th century, this was not a simple linear process.  Korean linguistic history and the 
nature of language itself resist such simplistic characterization, while the nebulous nature 
of nationalism further complicates a comfortable narrativization.  Special attention needs 
to be paid to the interconnected nature of nationalism, colonialism, the popular press, and 
education in any attempt to tease out the particularities of language in relation to the 
Korean nation.       







Part 2. Han’gŭl for the Nation: Munmyŏng Kaehwa and the Roots of  
                                           Modern Korean 
 
2.1. Viewing Korea’s Language Reform from a Socio-Linguistic Perspective 
 
 
Much Korean language research on twentieth century Korean linguistics since the 1970’s  
has approached the issue from an institutional or organizational theoretical perspective,  
alternately focusing on the well-known pioneers of the Korean language movement  
working within various indigenous language organizations or the enforcement and effects  
of Japanese Government general language policies.  Much of this research is  
characterized by detailed historical documentation and phonetic and morphological  
linguistic theory, yet few insights into the meaning of the Korean language, Han’gŭl, and  
the language reform movement in the broader historical context.  In other words, this  
research addresses the question of who and how, but not sufficiently the question of why.   
For example, A 50-year History of the Han’gŭl Society (Han’gŭl Hakhoe 50Nyŏn-sa)— 
the definitive history of this most important of Korean language organizations—provides  
a detailed, comprehensive look at the efforts of the club to compile a dictionary, reform  
Korean spelling, and promulgate Han’gŭl in Korean schools often against the resistance  
of colonial authority, but the book fails to situate the language movement within the  
context of the broader ideological transformations taking shape in Korea during the  
time.1 In his article The Independent and Han’gŭl Culture, Yi Ki-mun stresses the  
heretofore underestimated role of Sŏ Chae p’il in Han’gŭl pioneering while showing the  
significance of The Independent newspaper in elevating the Korean script and  
demonstrating Han’gŭl’s potential.2 However, this work, too, falls short of addressing  
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the central meaning of Han’gŭl to the emerging Korean nation in terms of modernist  
discourses like munmyŏng kaehwa.  Other works by authors such as Kim Sŏk-tŭk, Ko  
Yŏng-gŭn and Yi Ŭng-ho provide detailed accounts of the specific linguistic proposals  
and accomplishments of early language reformers like Chu Si-kyŏng as well as the  
contributions of various other actors—such as the National Script Research Institute, the  
National Script Tongsik Hoe and the Catholic Church—to the language reform  
movement.3 While these are invaluable sources for chronological information on the  
purely linguistic aspects of the Korean language in the 20th century, they are of little  
relevance to the theoretical thrust of this paper.  Rather than focusing on the nuts and  
bolts of language reform in Korea through organizational deliberations and Governor  
General language policy, this current study situates language within the theoretical  
constructs of power, civilization and enlightenment, and nationalism.  In other words,  
how have the issues surrounding Korean language since the late 19th century reflected  
class/colonial power relations, the modernizing discourse of munmyŏng kaehwa, and  
nationalism, especially under colonial rule. 
     In focusing on the role of script, language, and education in munmyŏng kaehwa of the  
late 19th and early 20th centuries, this paper follows the theoretical lead of recent works  
on the Korean Enlightenment Period by scholars such as Andre Schmid, Shin Ki-wook,  
Im Hyŏng Taek and Yi Hye-ryŏng which have moved past the organizational and  
institutional linguistic history characteristic of the research mentioned above to a more  
socio-linguistic conceptualization of Korean based on language and modernization,  
specifically the discourse on munmyŏng kaehwa.  In Korea Between Empires, Andre  
Schmid demonstrates the centrality of the epistemological shift from classical Confucian 
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education to modern, Western education related directly to language and script, a 
philosophical lead I pursue in this section.  In a related theoretical thread, Yi Hye-ryŏng 
stresses the importance of “hanja perception” in late Chosŏn and how this shifting 
perception both reflected the changing relationship between Korea and China and in turn 
influenced further discussion on the topic in the popular press.4 More importantly, she 
states, “the transformation in hanja/hanmun perception represented a fundamental turn in 
the entire East Asian episteme.”5 In the book Ethnic Nationalism in Korea, Shin Ki-wook 
similarly emphasizes the critical role of new modernizing ideologies in shaping the 
emerging Korean nation. Shin designates pan-Asianists and nationalists as the dominant 
forces during the Enlightenment period, and characterizes both of these groups as 
influenced by munmyŏng kaehwa ideology yet divergent as to the specific path toward 
modernization: “whereas pan-Asianists advocated a broad, regional identity and 
solidarity, nationalists regarded nation, not race or region, as the basis for a new, modern 
Korean identity.”6 Despite these variances, each group was guided by the concept of 
international competition couched in a social-Darwinist framework, whether it be 
competition between regions/races (pan-Asianists) or nations (nationalists).  The most 
effective approach to this competition was the modernization and refinement of education 
in the vernacular language.  Im Hyŏng taek also mentions the unassailable connection 
between modern education and the new Korean nation, stating simply that “the modern 
nation was the foundation of the people, and the establishment of national education was 
considered a fundamental theme of that modern nation.”7       
     This theoretical approach to Korean language focusing on the East Asian episteme  
shift engendered by modernist discourses such as munmyŏng kaehwa provides a fresh  
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alternative to other forms of linguistic history.  By focusing on the historical reasons  
behind script reform, (rather than the chronology and methodology of implementation),  
this approach reveals the macro-level interconnectedness of the nation, modernization,  
education, and language.  As I will demonstrate, the influence of munmyŏng kaehwa was  
profoundly felt by the first generation of reform intellectuals, whether pan-Asianists or  
nationalists.  If munmyŏng kaewha offered a conceptual framework in which various  
groups could come to terms with their recent integration into the global capitalist system,  
then the most influential blueprint for successful participation in this system was  
illustrated by the ideology of social-Darwinism.  According to this perception of the  
world, Korea could no longer be content riding on the coattails of a larger power (China),  
but would have to instead develop its institutions and culture.  In this system of intense  
competition, unlike in the violent realm of lower animals, human beings’ best chance for  
ascendancy to ‘enlightened’ status was through improvement in education.  The ‘new  
learning’ (sinhak) accompanying munmyŏng kaehwa was to replace Confucian education,  
which had become all but obsolete.  Not only was the underlying education (moral  
lessons for yangban officials through Chinese literature) called into question, but the very  
script with which it was written.  Korea was facing an existential crisis and had not the  
time to waste on years of difficult writing; this sinhak had to be imported, absorbed, and  
instituted quickly.  The race between nations was on, and Japan was waiting in the wings  
to pounce should Korea falter.  In this way, Han’gŭl became the new raison d’etre for  
the Korean nation within the munmyŏng kaewha formulation.  Han’gŭl-vernacular  
promotion would make rapid, mass education possible, in turn elevating the global  
competitive potential of Korea in the race between nations (social-Darwinism) and  
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allowing a successful integration into the global capitalist system (munmyŏng kaewha).           
This theoretical perspective demonstrates the centrality of language and script in the  
Korean experience and contributes to a growing body of critical socio-linguistic research 
on Korea. 
     At the close of the 19th century, Korean found itself at a historical crossroads.  A 
dynasty that had existed for over half a millennia suddenly faced an existential dilemma.  
The Chosŏn Dynasty, which had enjoyed a stable existence since the late 14th century 
based upon a neo-Confucian state ideology and essentially Sino-centric epistemology, 
became inundated with a multiplicity of radical, revolutionary new ideas.  These ideas 
competed for the hearts and minds of the Korean people and the future direction of the 
Korean nation, in the process generating new dialogue among the educated elite and 
engendering drastic transformations.  One influential ideology that captured the 
imagination of many educated Koreans was the idea of munmyŏng kaehwa.  Munmyŏng 
kaehwa had a certain universal appeal as it sought to provide a conceptual framework for 
the integration of the Korean nation into the global capitalist order, based in part on the 
promotion of new knowledge (sinhak) and a radical rethinking of the nation and its 
identity.  At the root of this new knowledge promotion was a reconceptualization of the 
role of language in general and a reevaluation of linguistic hierarchy on the Korean 
peninsula in particular.  The centuries-old monopoly on knowledge and social 
advancement held by classical Chinese was questioned and then attacked, while the 
growing importance attached to the rapid acquisition of new knowledge raised doubts as 
to the efficacy of continued Chinese character utilization. Korean reformers began to 
question Chinese characters’ claim of exclusivity in the acquisition of ‘true’ knowledge 
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and for the first time (in increasingly nationalistic tones) emphasized the foreignness of 
the script while promoting the usage of Han’gŭl.8 The movement to promote Han’gŭl 
usage and standardization quickly gained momentum, with the press gradually following 
suit in its publications.  In a single generation, Han’gŭl had gone from a marginalized, 
denigrated, even vilified script, to a valued, lionized asset for the Korean nation.  To 
understand the significance of this transformation, a short history of the script’s 




2.2. A Seed Sewn on Barren Soil: The Promulgation 
 




The speech sounds of our nation are different from those of China and are not confluent 
in writing.  Thus, there are many among the ignorant peasants who, when they have 
something they wish to say, are ultimately unable to express their meanings.  Taking pity 
on this, I have newly created twenty-eight letters, and simply wish for any and all to learn 




Such were the words of King Sejong the Great, written over 550 years ago.  These now  
well-known, oft-quoted lines first appeared in the preface to the 1446 Hunminchŏngŭm.  
Attached to this was a document written by a number of scholars working under King 
Sejong entitled Hunminchŏngŭm haerye (訓民正音解例), a sort of handbook explaining 
the various sounds and usages of the new, indigenous Korean script, Han’gŭl.  This 
pragmatic approach to language would be echoed half a millennia later by nationalist 
reformers emphasizing the possible role of Han’gŭl in mass education, while the 
benevolent, populist tone of King Sejong in promoting Han’gŭl would be invoked by 
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these same reformers in calling on the nation to respect the gift of their generous 
benefactor.  However, much like the reformers of the early 20th century, King Sejong met 
with bitter resistance from the only group in any position to argue, the yangban elite.  
Having received an exclusive education in Chinese literature based upon gender and 
noble pedigree, the yangban class had little incentive to accept this new script, at best a 
simple, vulgar form of writing, at worst a fundamental threat to their social position and 
way of life.  Indeed, the royal provenance of Han’gŭl was most likely the saving grace of 
the script, though even this did not guarantee Han’gŭl’s survival.  Had Han’gŭl been 
invented by a commoner or even by a respected member of the yangban, it is doubtful 
whether it would have survived the close-minded, hostile intellectual climate of the 
Chosŏn period.   
     The opening salvo of attacks was publicly issued in 1444, just months after the  
invention of Han’gŭl in the twelfth month of 1443.  King Sejong had gathered together 
and nurtured a number of scholars in what was called Chiphyŏnjŏn—an official academic 
research institution—and a number of dissident scholars from this group banded together 
to submit a memorial to King Sejong opposing the creation of the new script.10 The most 
representative member of this group was a scholar by the name of Ch’oe Man-ri.  In his 
now well-known six-point argument against the adoption of the new script, Ch’oe 
invoked allegiance to inherited knowledge and reaffirmed the exclusive link between 
Chinese characters and this knowledge.  Specifically, Ch’oe characterized the creation of 
a phonetic script separate from Chinese characters as a shameful act vis-à-vis China, in 
light of centuries of “emulation” and “servitude” (pokjong).11 In addition, Ch’oe drew a 
linkage between Chosŏn and other peoples in Asia using indigenous, non-Chinese scripts, 
	  34	  
claiming that the adoption of the new script would demote Chosŏn to the level of these 
other “barbarians” (orangk’ae).12 Ch’oe further complained that the new script, being “so 
very simple” and “even more base than idu” would “alienate [Chosŏn] from high Chinese 
culture…and thus downgrade [Chosŏn’s] cultural level.”13 Finally Ch’oe, from a political 
standpoint, suggested subjecting the matter to “repeated inquiry and consideration” as the 
project was “being expedited without the benefit of any such prudence by a small number 
of people in a rash fashion.”14  
     King Sejong, in a strongly worded response, attacked the basic assumptions of  
Ch’oe’s criticisms while questioning his and other scholars’ knowledge of linguistic  
matters.  Sejong likened the invention of Han’gŭl to that of idu, stating that, like Sŏl  
Ch’ong before him, he was merely attempting to assist the commoners with their written  
language in order to make life easier.15 Finally, replying to those scholars who questioned  
the Crown Prince’s involvement in the Han’gŭl project, King Sejong defended his son’s  
involvement, claiming that the project was no mere novelty, but an important matter of  
state.16 However, King Sejong did not directly address the core issues relating to  
Han’gŭl’s invention.  That is, Sejong did not mention the link between knowledge and  
Chinese characters nor did he challenge the notion that utilization of these characters  
determined the level of a country’s civilization and enlightenment.  Rather, he  
emphasized the practical application of Han’gŭl for the common people.  It must be  
observed that Sejong was not attempting to replace Chinese writing, only confer upon  
commoners a sort of communicative ability while supplementing the Korean  
language as it was employed by the yangban with a kind of pronunciation aide for  
Chinese writing.  Sejong’s attitude toward Han’gŭl invention and propagation may be  
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viewed as a kind of political maneuvering, a deft tactical decision evincing foresight and  
an awareness of the Chosŏn intellectual climate.  Even if King Sejong was a highly  
enlightened individual indeed and anticipated the importance that a simplified,  
popularized script would play in the ‘modern’ state in terms of education, the Sino- 
centric Confucian epistemology of his day was simply too psychologically comprehen- 
sive and all-encompassing to allow any significant threat to its core tenets.  Observing the 
entrenched links between classical Chinese education and elite social status while 
perceiving minimal potential for acquisition among commoners, Sejong likely chose to 
promote Han’gŭl on the basis of mass practicality in utilization.  Predicting Han’gŭl’s 
probable rejection by the yangban, Sejong targeted the commoner in promoting and 
defending Han’gŭl as this group would be most receptive to and aided by the script. 
Thanks to Sejong’s tireless efforts—as well as the ingeniousness of design and royal 
origin—Han’gŭl survived through the centuries despite efforts by critics like Ch’oi Man-
ri. 
     The objections to Han’gŭl raised by certain yangban scholars are understandable and  
must have been easy to predict for King Sejong.  After all, mass literacy might have  
posed a threat to the privileged position of the yangban elite, though a phonetic script  
alone would have provided little utility in understanding classical texts, as it were.  The  
very idea of a competing mode of knowledge, however, especially one so easily  
mastered, would have been an affront to the elite’s position, an affront to what Pierre  
Bourdieu has termed “distinction.”17 Distinction, used here in a very specific linguistic  
sense, refers to the competence necessary in order to speak (and use) the legitimate  
language in a society.  According to Bourdieu, what is rare is of course not the capacity  
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to speak, but competence in the legitimate language, which “re-translates social  
distinctions into the specifically symbolic knowledge of differential deviations, or, in  
short, distinctions.”18 In the linguistic market where legitimate languages and other  
languages compete, legitimate competence can translate into “linguistic capital,”  
producing a “profit of distinction.”19 In the case of Korea, the yangban may have  
perceived the introduction of Han’gŭl and the concomitant promotion of the vernacular  
language as an assault on their profit of distinction derived from competence in the  
legitimate language, classical Chinese.  Naturally, the class possessing the most linguistic  
capital would have the most to lose from mass literacization as a competing language  
would potentially diminish the margin of profit of distinction the class enjoyed.  From  
this perspective, the objections of elite scholars educated in Chinese literature are  
understandable and in fact characteristic of most linguistic communities.20 However,  
what does not seem representative of most linguistic situations is the fact that one 
member of this dominant class—the most powerful member—chose to promote a script  
which offered no personal gain in linguistic capital and actually threatened his own class’  
profit of distinction.  Bourdieu may again offer an explanation to this apparent  
contradiction. 
     In promoting a script suitable for the vernacular language and directed not at the  
literate yangban alone but crafted also for the uneducated masses, King Sejong exhibited  
behavior uncharacteristic of a dominant social class.   However, this behavior may be  
partially explained by what Bourdieu has termed strategies of condescension.21 Through  
this strategy, individuals with socially recognized proficiency in the dominant, legitimate  
language (such as King Sejong) derive profit from the symbolic negation of the linguistic  
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hierarchy of a society.  This profit exists because, according to critical linguistic theory,  
languages receive value only in relation to the market of languages, a value in turn  
depending on “the relation of power that is concretely established between the speakers’  
linguistic competences.”22 Therefore, being guaranteed wide recognition of participation  
in the dominant language by virtue of his inculcation in classical Chinese literature,  
Sejong symbolically negated the hierarchy between classical Chinese, Han’gŭl and  
vernacular Korean and in turn combined the “profits linked to the undiminished hierarchy  
with those derived from the distinctly symbolic negation of the hierarchy.”23 Sejong 
could ‘afford’ to do so due to his widely recognized proficiency in the dominant  
language. 
     This extraction of profit through symbolic negation does not suggest, however, a cold, 
calculating decision, a kind of cynical attempt at personal gain disguised as altruism.  
Rather, this negation represents a successful assessment by King Sejong of the price 
formation of his particular linguistic market, while the clear acquisition of profit, in the 
form of praise and support from Koreans lacking competence in the dominant language—
both then and today—was made possible due to a well-defined, widely acknowledged 
hierarchical distinction between the dominant classical Chinese and subordinate 
Han’gŭl/vernacular.  Sejong’s strategy of condescension, then, was not a calculating 
business decision based on profit gain, but a (largely unconscious) value judgment 
reflecting a keen awareness and innate understanding of the linguistic market of the day.  
Importantly, the next generation of Han’gŭl/vernacular promoters over four hundred 
years later would be men from comparable (though not royal) educational backgrounds: 
men of elite status, their competence in the dominant language (classical Chinese) 
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beyond reproach.  Though Han’gŭl eventually established a foothold among the 
commoners—aided by its more successful adoption by certain subgroups and the 
significant boost it enjoyed in connection with mid-19th-century Christianity—the script 
never seriously vied for dominant-language status until the condescension strategies of 
late 19th and early 20th century intellectuals symbolically traversed the linguistic 
hierarchy once again to bring Han’gŭl into the light.24 Below, I will briefly chronicle the 
path of Han’gŭl through the Chosŏn Dynasty, foreshadowing its eventual resurrection 
and renewed promotion during the Enlightenment period.  A look at Han’gŭl during the 
Chosŏn Dynasty will reveal the roots of the modern Korean language and illustrate its 




2.3. The Status of ‘Ŏnmun’ During the Chosŏn Dynasty 
 
 
     The story of Han’gŭl’s dogged perseverance from the time of initial promulgation to  
its ‘reemergence’ in the late 19th century is a well-known narrative in modern South  
Korea.25 According to this grand narrative, Han’gŭl was the ingenious invention of a  
benevolent king, a truly singular script in world history uniquely adapted to the Korean  
language.  However, having been rejected and abused by the selfish, ungrateful yangban,  
Han’gŭl survived in the shadows, protected by Buddhists, women, and children until the  
1890’s Kabo reforms, when the intellectual class saw the error of its ways and resurrected  
Han’gŭl for a new, modern era.  Though overly simplified, this narrative reflects many  
common assumptions about Han’gŭl during the Chosŏn Dynasty and echoes much of the  
Korean and English language research on the subject.  In particular, Han’gŭl’s supposed  
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‘protection’ by women and Buddhists is a point repeated in a variety of works, often with  
little or any supporting evidence.26 While evidence does exist suggesting Han’gŭl’s  
widespread usage in Buddhist canon, most research that I am aware of fails to cite  
specific examples of this phenomenon, instead merely parroting this ‘fact’ as if it were  
accepted dogma.  As for the even more widely accepted idea that Han’gŭl usage was  
more prevalent among women than men, even less evidence is provided.27 It seems that  
the more often this ‘truth’ is repeated, the more readily it is believed without a demand  
for evidence.  In contrast to the widely held belief that Han’gŭl usage was largely limited  
to Buddhist sutras and internal correspondence among women, Han’gŭl was adapted to a  
variety of genres and formats, and was likely utilized more broadly among lower class  
and even upper class men than is often understood. 
     In Writing Women in Korea, Theresa Hyun enumerates several areas of literature  
affected by the introduction of Han’gŭl, including the Buddhist canon, the Chinese  
classics, poetry, didactic texts aimed at women, and the annotation system for Chinese  
literature.28 Vernacular translations of Buddhist scriptures began under King Sejong and  
continued under the direction of his successors.  Just as the translation of Buddhist  
literature from Sanscrit or Pali into Chinese contributed to the expression of abstract  
concepts in the language, so too did the translation of the Chinese versions into chŏngŭm  
expand the Korean philosophical vocabulary.29 Ross King writes of Han’gŭl that “its ease  
of use made it especially attractive to Buddhists, who found in the Korean script a useful  
tool for evangelization and the propagation of Buddhist doctrine.”30 Another major  
contribution of Han’gŭl to Chosŏn literary life was the translation of classical Chinese  
texts using the ŏnhae method.31 According to Theresa Hyun, writing on translation in  
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Chosŏn Korea, “from the late 15th to the late 16th centuries translation activities focused  
on Chinese classics, works dealing with Confucian ethics, literary works, and texts on  
medicine and agriculture.”32 Ŏnhae versions of the works of Tang poet Tu Fu also  
appeared in 1481 shortly after Han’gŭl’s promulgation, showing the ability of the new  
script to cross genres with ease.  Han’gŭl soon came to be adopted as the exclusive genre  
for lyrical poetry, and much 16th century Han’gŭl literature has been passed down in the  
form of Akjang kasa, the Sinyong hyangakbo, and the sijo and kasa preserved in the  
collected works of Chŏng Ch’ŏl (1536-93).33 As early as the 17th century, Han’gŭl  
literature was developed and diversified into various forms, including verse, fictional  
historical narratives, and diaries, a trend which intensified after the 18th century.34  
Furthermore, as works written in Chinese characters dwarfed the amount of literature  
penned in Han’gŭl alone, translation employing first the ŏnhae method and later more  
colloquial Korean continued during the Chosŏn Dynasty among not only upper and lower  
class men but also some women.  As this research demonstrates, Han’gŭl gradually  
gained a foothold in a myriad of literary genres and was utilized by diverse groups  
in Chosŏn society, though its status never rivaled that of Chinese writing in the eyes of  
the yangban elite nor was it ever targeted for promotion by lower classes. 
     Although women are often cited as primary users of Han’gŭl during the Chosŏn  
Dynasty, some evidence suggests not only that Han’gŭl utilization may have been  
comparable or even more widespread among men, but also that a greater number of  
women than is often believed may have been educated in Chinese literature.  Writing on  
readership during the late Chosŏn Dynasty, Ji-Eun Lee questions the widely accepted  
script-gender dichotomy that has been advanced in much Korean scholarship on the  
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period, citing a problematic lack of evidence.  Lee claims that, due to this dearth of  
archival evidence on size and location of readership, the assumption that men read the  
true script (chinmun) and women read Han’gŭl becomes “default practice,”35 and the  
conjecture is repeated with little or no supporting evidence, simply because it is the most  
likely scenario.  However, Lee contends that “no single group can be shown, by their  
demonstrated readership practices, to represent only one kind of script; social or gender  
category does not, in practice, map well onto genre of writing.”36 Rather than a  
correspondence between Han’gŭl and the female gender, Lee argues persuasively for a  
stronger connection between men and Han’gŭl by pointing out that men had more access  
not only to vernacular literature but also literature in general, and that a vast majority of  
women were illiterate while a majority of men were literate.37 This would suggest that,  
among literate women, even if a greater number were literate in Han’gŭl than in hanmun  
(which was likely due to the vast amount of time needed for literacy in the latter and the  
insufficient time that would have been afforded to women for such an endeavor), because  
of the overwhelming discrepancy in literacy rates between the sexes, male usage of  
Han’gŭl would still have been considerably higher.  Lee also notes a number of Chosŏn  
women who wrote letters, philosophical debates, and poetry in hanmun, defying the  
conventions of their time and making a gender distinction based on script even more  
untenable.38  
     Why, then, did vernacular writing come to be associated with women and other 
‘inferior’ groups?  It seems that, even though the usage of Han’gŭl was most definitely 
not limited to these groups, the important thing was the maintenance of at least the 
semblance of social hierarchy based on educational attainment.  Certain yangban men 
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may have dabbled in vernacular novels when no one was looking, and exceptional 
women may have strived for a proscribed education in classical Chinese.  However, as 
long as the fundamental basis of knowledge and tradition upon which Chosŏn society 
was founded remained unchallenged—a political elite determined by rarified knowledge 
of classical Chinese and a largely uneducated female gender relegated to the inner 
quarters—minor transgressions could be affectively ignored while general assumptions 
could be successfully perpetuated.  It was in the waning years of the Chosŏn Dynasty, 
though, that this fundamental basis began to erode under various competing forces. 
Ideologies such as civilization and enlightenment challenged the foundations of 
Confucian knowledge and suggested new directions for a modern nation.  At the center of 
this modernist discourse was the debate over language or, more fundamentally, the 
definition of relevant knowledge in the new world order. 
 
 
2.4. Reassessing Knowledge and Resurrection of ‘The Great Script’ 
 
 
In the closing years of the 19th century, two revolutionary events occurred which signaled  
the winds of modernization and change sweeping through East Asia.  These events,  
though limited in immediate influence, would prove to be bellwethers of eventual change  
in Chosŏn society.  The first event was the Kabo Reforms of 1894-1895, “a sweeping set  
of changes in government structure, fiscal organization, methods of government  
recruitment, and traditional social norms” spearheaded by the Japanese during their brief  
occupation of Seoul during the Sino-Japanese War.39 The second event occurred the  
following year with the publishing of Korea’s first pure-Han’gŭl daily newspaper, The  
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Independent (Tongnip Sinmun).  These were significant events in Korea’s modern history  
for several reasons.  First, they represent the two important forms of change in late  
Chosŏn as well as colonial Korean society.  The Kabo Reforms, much like later colonial  
policies, were initiated at the behest of the Japanese government and represent coercive  
reform from the top down.  On the other hand, the publishing of The Independent was an  
example of a relatively more populist type of reform led by what Michael Robinson has  
termed “transitional intellectuals,” those trained “in the 1880’s in traditional Confucian  
studies, but increasingly interested in the new Western learning that emerged after the  
abolition of the traditional examination system.”40 These reform-minded intellectuals  
continued to play an important role during the colonial period, as well.  Second, each of  
these events directly affected and reflected the linguistic situation in Korea and East Asia  
at that time.  The designation of vernacular writing in Han’gŭl as the national language  
(kugŏ) of Korea through the Kabo Reforms was undoubtedly influenced by Japan’s own  
recent language reforms, while The Independent’s utilization of pure Han’gŭl (and word  
spacing) reflected the Western education of the newspaper editors and contributors and  
encouraged other publications to follow suit.  Finally, these two events were heavily  
influenced by Western or Japanese-mediated modern ideologies, especially civilization  
and enlightenment (munmyŏng kaehwa, 文明開化).  The Korean press played an  
instrumental role in disseminating information and shaping opinion, specifically on the  
role of vernacular Korean/Han’gŭl in modernization couched in the munmyŏng kaehwa  
paradigm.  An analysis of specific newspaper articles from this period will demonstrate  
this role.   
     The Kabo Reforms of 1894-1895 were a revolutionary set of reforms for their time,  
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dealing with all manner of Korean life, from government organization, royal status and  
financial management to government recruitment, marriage practice and even dress  
code.  The reforms relevant to my discussion here, however, were those pertaining to  
education and language.  The Kabo Reforms abolished the traditional government  
examination system based on Confucian studies while simultaneously creating a  
recommendation system that privileged the new skills learned in the growing number of  
schools that emphasized Western curricula, such as foreign languages, Western history  
and politics, commerce and science.41 Though there was a considerable lag between  
proclamation and implementation of many social reforms such as the approval of  
remarriage for widows and the abolition of slavery, the abolition of the traditional  
government examination had an immediate impact on an entire generation of scholars in  
the midst of their test preparation.  The switch in credentialing systems for government  
service from Confucian studies to new Western-influenced curricula engendered a  
shift in academic interest among many of the educated elite and signaled the beginnings 
of an epistemological shift in Korea.  Modern schools teaching a Western curriculum 
continued to spread, spearheaded first by Western missionaries and later strengthened by 
government credentialing.  In addition to these educational issues, the Kabo Reforms 
directly addressed the matter of national language and script.  Below is article 14 of King 
Kojong’s 1894 royal decree to the Korean people, issued in the Government Gazette 




“Legislation and Royal ordinances take the national script (kungmun) as their basis; a 
hanmun translation may be attached, or else they shall be written in a mixed Sino-Korean 
script.”43 
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This brief footnote is significant for several reasons.  On the one hand, this proclamation  
was the first instance that Han’gŭl was officially designated as national script (kukmun),  
showing a crystallization of nation-language association and suggesting perhaps a streak  
of Japanese language ideological influence.  On the other hand, this designation as  
national script vaulted Han’gŭl to a renewed position of prestige.  In the blink of an eye,  
Han’gŭl had been officially promoted from ‘female script’ (amgŭl) and ‘vulgar script’  
(ŏnmun) to foremost representative of the Korean nation.  Han’gŭl, a script whose very  
appearance in official government documents would have been previously unthinkable,  
now was not only included in these documents but was to become the very basis of them.   
The usage of Han’gŭl also promoted more inclusivity among Koreans from a variety of  
classes and backgrounds; legislation and Royal ordinances written in the vernacular could  
reach a larger audience and engage them in affairs of state.  Interestingly, however, this  
statute also foreshadowed the actual direction the Korean language would take among  
elite circles, namely the ascendance of kukhanmun.  As Ko Yŏng jin demonstrates in an  
article on Korean language modernization, despite the announcement of this statute  
promoting Han’gŭl on paper, it was generally not followed by government officials, aside  
from some special decrees directed to the commoners.44 One reason for the failure to  
follow through on this particular statute was due simply to a lack of preparatory  
conditions for implementation.45 Being government ministers with similar educational  
backgrounds, the drafters of any official documents would have been well-versed in  
Chinese writing but not necessarily in Han’gŭl, still considered vulgar if not superfluous  
script.  Han’gŭl’s lack of unified orthographical and grammatical conventions further  
complicated an effective implementation in government bureaucracy.  Furthermore, the  
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influence of Japan, who had initially promoted the reforms, was fleeting, and the Korean  
progressives championing script reform whom Japan had supported during its temporary  
spike in influence still constituted a minority in the conservative Chosŏn government.   
For all of these reasons, Han’gŭl became not the basis of government documents but  
rather a supplementation to the necessary hanmun, while kukhanmun began its gradual  
ascendency among certain reform-minded intellectuals.  It would take a more radical  
movement outside the government to champion the promotion of pure Han’gŭl, a  
movement spearheaded more than anything by the 1896 inauguration of The Independent.      
 
The Independent and the Roots of the Korean Language Movement 
 
 
It was the spring of 1896, and on the Korean peninsula there prevailed a tumultuous  
atmosphere of excitement and uncertainty punctuated by the circulation of revolutionary  
new ideas. Just two years earlier, responding to an armed uprising in Korea’s southwest  
triggered by corruption but fueled by ideological grievances, China and Japan had  
simultaneously dispatched troops to Korea, resulting in the Sino-Japanese War.46 Japan’s  
victory led to a temporary surge in influence on the peninsula, culminating in the  
progressive Kabo Reforms of 1894.  Queen Min—symbolic leader of the anti-Japanese  
faction in the Chosŏn bureaucracy—had just been assassinated in 1895, and King Kojong  
was now in hiding at the Russian embassy for fear of his life.  It was during this period,  
on April 7, 1896, that the first peoples’ newspaper written in the vernacular language— 
The Independent—was inaugurated.  The Independent was the mouthpiece of The  
Independence Club (Tongnip hyŏphoe), an organization founded by the American- 
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educated and naturalized Philip Jaesohn (Sŏ Chae p’il, 1864-1951).  Representative of the 
reform spirit of the day, The Independence Club “was a private organization where 
officials and private citizens gathered to discuss policy issues and reform proposals,”47 in 
effect breaking the monopoly on political discussion held by the yangban elite.  The three  
principle goals of the Independence Club were “to strengthen Korean independence,  
promote national self-strengthening, and advocate democratic participation in 
government decisions.”48 Importantly, the club “chartered a course for a movement that  
encompassed public education, the creation of a national newspaper (The Independent),  
and the beginning of language reform, all projects that anticipated the gradual emergence  
of a new public sphere in Korea.”49 
     In support of The Independence Club reform agenda, The Independent newspaper  
editorialized on a wide variety of national affairs.  One issue that appeared with  
frequency in the pages of The Independent was language and script reform.  Since the  
choice to publish in Han’gŭl-only was such a trailblazing effort, far ahead of public  
sentiment or any organic trend, the choice should be viewed as a very deliberate  
statement about national unity and modernization, and so the prevalence of editorials on  
script and language is to be expected.  Indeed, the inaugural issue itself began with a  
lengthy treatise on the importance of script choice by the founder of The Independence  
Club, Sŏ Chae p’il.  An excerpt of this well-known editorial is as follows: 
 
Our newspaper is written not in hanmun but exclusively in the national script (kukmun) 
so all people high and low (sang ha kui ch’ŏn) may see it.  Also, we have introduced 
word spacing to the national script for ease of reading so that all may examine the 
newspaper contents in detail.  In every country (kakkuk), regardless of gender (namnyŏ 
mullonhago) it is natural that people first learn and master the kukmun before learning 
foreign writing. However, in Chosŏn, because we study only hanmun without even 
knowing kukmun, it is rare to come across one who knows kukmun well.  Comparing 
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kukmun to hanmun, the first reason that kukmun is so superior is due to its ease of 
learning.  The second reason is that, being the writing of Chosŏn, the people of Chosŏn 
know kukmun, and so writing in it instead of in hanmun allows all people great and small 
to read with ease.  Since our people (Chosŏn inmin) have developed the habit of learning 
only hanmun while discarding kukmun, they have become proficient in hanmun and 
remain unfamiliar with kukmun, a truly lamentable condition.50 
 
This editorial is significant for several reasons.  It is one of the first publications written  
by a member of the intellectual class to publicly advocate Han’gŭl.  Not since the 15th  
century had such a person openly promoted Korea’s indigenous script, and much like  
centuries ago, the support came not from the lower classes who most utilized the script,  
but from the intellectual class.  Even more striking, the author was not merely advocating  
the incorporation of Han’gŭl in creating Sino-Korean mixed script or promoting a special  
sphere of usage for Han’gŭl, but attacking the very source of knowledge at that time,  
hanmun.  Indeed, later in the essay, the author audaciously claims that, “not knowing  
hanmun does not make one ignorant.  Rather, when a person knows only kukmun along  
with other knowledge and worldly matters, that person is more lofty and intelligent than  
the man who knows only hanmun.”51 With one fell swoop, Sŏ attacks the fundamental  
epistemology of East Asia, the basis of knowledge which had undergirded elite Korean  
society for centuries.  The author was in effect upending the hierarchy of knowledge by  
promoting the Han’gŭl script above hanmun in new knowledge attainment.  This  
statement also hinted at the superior efficacy of phonetic alphabets in gaining “other  
knowledge” and becoming aware of “worldly matters.”52 Another interesting aspect of  
this essay is the repeated usage (seven times) of the term sang ha kui ch’ŏn (上下貴賤).   
This term evokes the universality and populist appeal of the indigenous script, and  
foreshadows the eventual direction of the newspaper itself in the coming years.  As Sŏ  
writes in another part of the editorial, a major aim of the paper would be to report  
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government operations and new legislation to the people to keep them informed and  
engaged in politics.  This represented a ground-breaking endeavor, the birth of a  
forum in which, for the first time, members of disparate classes were simultaneously  
engaged in the same political process, breaking the monopoly of the yangban on political  
affairs.  An additional feature of this essay I should point out is the copious (indeed  
exclusive) use of the term kukmun for Han’gŭl.53  This constitutes a decided break with  
the epithets of old and represents a conscious effort on the part of the author to connect  
language with the Korean nation in a way that was gaining momentum among the 
educated class but had not yet supplanted other terminologies.  Though the term kukmun 
had been used before this publication—it was the term employed in the Kabo Reforms to 
refer to Han’gŭl—a consensus had yet to emerge around the national language (kukmun) 
status of Han’gŭl.  I argue that the usage of the term kukmun and the implementation of 
word spacing (a pioneering feat) also reflected the academic background and intellectual 
disposition of the author.  His time spent in Japan shortly after the discursive and political 
solidification of the country-language (國 – 文) connection probably informed his 
ideology in writing this editorial, while his experience with the English language would 
have opened his eyes to the possibilities of word spacing. 
     A final common element throughout this piece is the repeated appeal to Han’gŭl’s  
ease of learning.  This is a point that was repeated by subsequent reform-minded  
intellectuals as evidence of Han’gŭl’s superiority in comparison to hanmun.  One early  
Korean language scholar who often employed this argument in his tireless promotion of  
Han’gŭl was a man by the name of Chu Si-kyŏng.54 Known as the father of modern  
Korean linguistics and often referred to as ‘Teacher Chu Si-kyŏng’ out of respect for his  
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pedagogical pedigree, Chu Si-kyŏng began his career as an editor at The Independent,  
assisting Sŏ Chae-p’il in publication of the paper, while employing some of his own  
linguistic theories first-hand and contributing a number of his own editorials to the paper.   
Though many Korean linguists have focused on his later accomplishments in the purely  
linguistic field, his early essays in The Independent helped to shape the nascent debate on  
language reform and reveal the influence of new modernizing ideologies like munmyŏng  
kaehwa.  Some of his earliest writings appeared as a three part series entitled Kukmunron  
(國文論) in The Independent during April and September of 1897.  These writings  
represent an informed approach to the Korean language and reflect not only his own  
linguistic prowess but the gradual maturation and refinement of the linguistic field in  
Korea.  Observing Chu Si-kyŏng’s meticulous attention to the details of language and his  
incredible insight into the possibilities and future applications of the Korean language, it  
is easy to understand why contemporary Korean linguists point to Chu’s career as the  
birth of modern Korean language research.   
     Instead of simply designating kukmun as Korean and hanmun as foreign and 
lamenting Korea’s ignorance and neglect of its own language as Sŏ Chae p’il had before 
him, Chu Si-kyŏng promoted the use of Han’gŭl from a universalizing linguistic 
perspective by appealing to the readers’ sense of practicality.  First, he divided the 
world’s languages into two broad groups: pictographs, or “writing that depicts shapes,” 
(kŭryŏ nohŭn kŭrim) and “writing that depicts sounds” (marŭl p’yohanŭn kŭl).55 The 
most relevant example of the former was of course Chinese writing, while Chu 
mentioned the invention of the Phoenician alphabet, modern European languages,  
Japanese kana and kukmun as examples of the latter mode of writing.56 Besides the  
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different manners of depiction, Chu claimed that the greatest and most significant  
difference between the two was the ease of learning; while writing that depicted sound 
(phonetic script), especially Han’gŭl, could be learned by even the most foolish of people 
within a single day, pictographic writing systems like hanmun consumed dozens of years 
on the path toward mastery.57 Importantly, Chu considered this time spent learning 
hanmun utterly wasted, arguing that during that same time people could learn a trade or 
study to become “politicians, diplomats… or lawyers.”58 In effect, Chu was advocating a 
division of labor based on new forms of knowledge acquired through modern education, 
an education which could be most efficaciously instilled through an ideographic writing  
system (Han’gŭl).  For Chu, reading and writing was not an end in itself but rather  
 a vehicle for acquiring every means of disparate knowledge, knowledge for which  
China was no longer the primary or even significant source.  Writing systems were to be  
judged on their communicative ability and pedagogical potential, and to these ends Chu  
proposed a full-scale Han’gŭl research project for the standardization of the language.  
He argued that, to maximize the latent potential of Han’gŭl and to ensure the successful 
propagation among the next generation, Han’gŭl must be adjusted to conform to 
colloquial speech (ŏnmun ilch’i, 言文一致), after which time the Korean language could 
be successfully implemented into the growing modern educational curriculum.  Finally, 
Chu stressed the importance of translation of foreign texts into kukmun in order to 
introduce more Koreans to outside literature and ideas, a sentiment that reveals his keen 
insight and forward-thinking nature. 
     In additional texts entitled “The Need for National Language and Script,” (Kugŏ wa  
kukmun ŭi p’iryo), and “The Need to Respect One’s National Script and Language”  
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(P’il sang chakuk munŏn), Chu expounded on his linguistic ideology.59 In this first  
essay, Chu presented the pictographic/phonetic language dichotomy along an  
epistemological divide, noting that, while more uncivilized ages (未開時代) were  
characterized by pictographic writing systems, ideographic languages like English,  
Japanese kana and chŏngŭm were representative of a more civilized era (開化時代).60    
Through this stark distinction between civilized and uncivilized periods, Chu drew a clear  
connection between language and modernization.  In the ten years since his first  
publications, Chu had extended his linguistic ideology to include not only practical  
matters such as ease of learning but also the role of language in determining civilizational  
progress.  Whereas 450 years earlier Ch’oe Man-ri had claimed that indigenous  
ideographic writing systems separate from Chinese characterized ‘barbaric’ cultures, Chu  
had now turned this argument on its head by asserting that phonetic scripts were actually  
the mark of enlightenment.  The reason was clear; what constituted relevant knowledge in  
the modern world had changed, and Korea would have to evolve to keep up in the  
competition among races.   
     In a second article that year featured in the Hwangsŏng sinmun, Chu expanded on this  
concept of ‘racial competition,’ displaying a social-Darwinist ideological bent influential  
among Korean intellectuals of the time.  In a familiar allusion to survival of the fittest  
mentality, Chu placed humans squarely within the biological spectrum along with all  
other animals, and claimed that, like these base creatures, humans must compete for  
survival.  Humans he characterized as weak in physical constitution yet highly intelligent,  
making them the strongest of the animals and necessitating a more refined form of  
competition.61 Rather than attributing this human superiority to military might or  
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knowledge per se, Chu makes the crucial connection between language and power,  
claiming that language is the basis of all knowledge and the fundamental catalyst driving  
success in the global competition among races.  Chu states that, “those races who do not  
develop their language and literature to learn the skills and techniques of other races  
will go into decline under the oppression of other more prosperous races.”62 To support  
this point, Chu makes a salient observation which would be echoed decades later in  
social-linguistic theory dealing with linguistic imperialism; not every language and script  
is inherently ‘equal’ as they both influence the intellectual attainment of a race and reflect  
the power wielded by it.  Chu cited as examples of oppressed races “African tribes” under  
colonialism, “Native Americans” and “Australian Aborigines,” groups who were  
“deprived of land and had their numbers decimated” because they were not able to  
cultivate their language and learning.63 Finally, Chu ingeniously linked the racial  
affinities and allegiances embedded in social-Darwinist ideology to Confucian piety by  
evoking Han’gŭl’s benevolent inventor, King Sejong.  In this way, Chu naturalized the  
links between language, power, race and state in a compelling argument for promotion of  
Han’gŭl.  To abandon or forget Korea’s script and to continue in a state of subservience  
and toadyism to things Chinese would be to share the fate of decimated indigenous  
populations the world over.  With this argument, Chu had raised the stakes on language  
and Han’gŭl; the failure to adopt and refine a phonetic script was not only impractical  
and inefficient, but a threat to the very existence of Korea. 
     Another prominent intellectual of the Enlightenment period inculcated in social- 
Darwinist thought was Yu Kil-chun.64 Much like Chu Si-kyŏng and other reformist  
intellectuals of the day, Yu divided nations of the world according to their level of  
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enlightenment.65 His well-known work “Theory of Competition” (Kyŏngjaengnon)  
reflected Japanese social-Darwinist thought of the time and influenced the first  
generation of Korean reformers.66 Defining the nation as a social organism at various  
levels of enlightenment (enlightened, semi-enlightened and unenlightened), nations  
struggled for survival much as other biological organisms did and, through competition,  
these nations could progress to higher levels of civilization and enlightenment.67 In the  
modern age, nations enhanced their competitive edge through modern education, which  
could be most effectively propagated through mass literacy in the national language and  
script.  In his most famous work Sŏyu Kyŏnmun (Things Seen and Heard in the West),  
Yu stressed the importance of education and warned of the dangers of ignorance: “Those  
who grow up ignorant and uneducated commit rash acts with no regard for those around  
them, breaking laws and causing injury to the righteous, law abiding people of the  
world…However, through the successful provision of an education system, a nation can  
instill goodness and teach morals, fostering a respectable, virtuous population.”68 His  
desire to inculcate the Korean population in the modern knowledge he attained abroad is  
reflected in his choice of script.  In the preface of Sŏyu kyŏnmun, Yu explains to a friend  
why he chose to compose his work in a Sino-Korean mixed script (kukhanmun), even  
though the conventions of his day would have dictated pure hanmun for such an  
academic piece, stating that “my principle aim was to convey the meaning plainly in 
spoken style so that even a barely literate individual would be able to understand the  
book material easily.”69 Yu goes on to explain the crucial role of concise, understandable  
language and script in conveying knowledge to a wide array of peoples: 
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             Our country’s script was created by our King Sejong The Great, while Chinese     
             characters we use along with China, but actually I find it dissatisfying that we cannot use    
             purely Korean characters.  Having already established diplomatic relations with various  
             foreign countries (people), it will not do if the real circumstances of all these people—old  
             and young, rich and poor—remain unknown to us.  So rather than getting our signals    
             crossed communicating our situation through awkward, course Chinese writing, I  
             think it more proper to express our true selves the way we are through fluent writing and    




Here, Yu echoes the sentiments of The Independent’s Sŏ Chae p’il and other reformers  
of the time with a universalist tone, calling on the popularization of knowledge about the  
“old and young, rich and poor” of the countries just entering Korea’s expanding orbit.   
Yu’s words represent the munmyŏng kaehwa spirit of the era, a desire to integrate a  
competitive Korean nation into the larger global order (evidenced by the establishment of  
diplomatic relations) through mass education and heightened awareness of the  
international system and its peoples.  The best way to ensure this education and  
awareness was through increased (preferably exclusive) usage of Han’gŭl.  Interestingly,  
Yu’s statement about wanting but not being able to write only in Han’gŭl was a common  
predicament during his time, reflecting the haphazard and negligent policy toward  
Han’gŭl and partially explaining the failure of the script to make a clean break from  
Chinese writing.  Most of the editorials championing a pure-Han’gŭl Korean peninsula  
were actually written in kukhanmun or hanmun because the majority of highly literate  
people had not been educated in Han’gŭl but hanmun, and the script was in such  
disrepair and in such need of standardization that even those with some fluency in  
it were not sure how to employ it in academic writing. Simply put, there were no  
conventions for academic Han’gŭl because it was never used in that realm.  Nevertheless, 
pioneers such as Yu Kil-jun paved the way for the intermediary kukhanmun by  
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publishing academic works in this style, while trailblazing efforts by The Independent  
and other periodicals showed the potential of Han’gŭl to accommodate academic writing  
and reach the masses in the process.   
     In response to this chaotic language situation at the turn of the century, a number of  
reformist intellectuals increasingly called for concrete steps in Han’gŭl standardization  
and implementation in schools.  Whereas early essays from the first generation of  
reformers such as Yu Kil-chun, Sŏ Chae-p’il and Chu Si-kyŏng included comparatively  
vague arguments for Han’gŭl usage based on ease of learning, efficacy in popular  
education and potential in enlightening the people, the number of articles in the popular  
press advancing specific writing and language reform theories began to increase in the  
early 20th century.  After an initial surge of discussion on writing reform at the close of  
the 19th century, there followed a period of near silence from 1899 to 1905 before the  
debate again heated up during the years leading up to Korea’s annexation.71 In a 1910  
article appearing in the Hwangsŏng sinmun, Yi Kwang-su, one of the most prominent  
Korean intellectuals of the period, repeats the earlier predicament of Yu Kil-jun while  
calling for action on the language reform front: 
 
So what style are we to use? Pure kukmun or kukhanmun?  If it were up to me I would  
want to write in pure kukmun, and I know that if I did so, it would work.                                
However, I also know that it would be very difficult, and therefore, it is impossible for 
me to advocate this position.  Being so difficult, I think that the only way to achieve this 
is through long-term, decisive action.72 
 
One early example of “decisive action” in language reform was a 1905 piece written by  
Chi Sŏg-yŏng entitled “Sinjŏng kukmun” (Newly Fixed Korean Script) appearing in the  
July 25 issue of the Kwanbo.73 As this two-page work was featured in the government  
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gazette, they were promulgated as official government policy and represent Korea’s first  
official attempt at language planning.74 Though Chi’s various proposals relating to  
Korean spelling, the introduction of a new graph, tense, unaspirated sounds, etc.— 
technically official government policy as late as 1910—seem to have been ignored, they  
nevertheless helped spark discussion on Han’gŭl reform and eventually led in 1907 to the  
establishment of the Kukmun yŏn’guso (National Script Research Institute), the first  
official research institution and government language-planning body.75 Also, there were  
several calls for the compilation of a standardized Korean dictionary to serve as the basis  
for children’s education.   
     Though the language debate had evolved and become more refined since the early  
days of The Independent, generally, the debate during this period still focused on the  
central macro-issue of script choice, namely, would hanmun, kukhanmun, or pure  
kukmun be used.  Articles supporting kukhanmun writing style were most prominent  
even up until the 1910 annexation, a trend reinforced by the majority of periodicals still 
being published in this style.  Even the occasional article championing pure–Han’gŭl  
was more often than not published in the kukhanmun style, owing to the lack of a clear,  
enforced standard of Han’gŭl.  However, the major arguments used in support of these  
respective scripts (kukmun and kukhanmun) were fundamentally the same.  Though  
Japan was cited in general terms by those advocating kukhanmun (e.g. Yi Nŭng-hwa, Yu  
Kil-jun, Han Hŭng-gyo, Yi Po-gyŏng) as an example of a nation which had successfully  
blended Chinese characters with its own indigenous script, other aspects of their  
arguments coincided with the Han’gŭl proponents in several ways.76 Because the  
kukhanmun faction supported the incorporation of some Han’gŭl, they did not  
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fundamentally oppose the very idea of the script as the hanmun proponents did.  Rather,  
the divergence of these groups was more a matter of timing and method than ideology.   
Like the kukmun proponents, those supporting kukhanmun repeated common themes  
such as ease of learning and its economical implications, loyalty and piety to King Sejong,  
independence, and national pride.  However, where mixed-script reformers perceived a  
gradual reduction in Chinese characters over time coupled with careful Han’gŭl  
standardization, kukmun supporters called for the immediate expulsion of Chinese  
characters from the Korean language.  One pro-kukmun reformer even recommended  
that Korea “consider any learner of a foreign language a non-citizen…prohibit study  
abroad,” and “restrict access to foreigners and foreign languages within Korea,”77  
showing the ultra-nationalistic tendencies of certain kukmun-only proponents. 
     If these reform-minded camps agreed on the basic objectives of the Korean language  
reform movement—Han’gŭl promotion and standardization and hanmun minimization— 
what were the views of the classical Chinese supporters?  The public response from  
hanmun supporters during this period (1895-1910) was conspicuously muted.  In fact,  
both Ross King and Andre Schmid mention the same solitary essay in their discussions  
of the language debate, a short, untitled piece by a virtually unknown educator appearing  
in the conservative periodical Taedong hakhoe wŏlbo (Monthly of the Great Eastern  
Educational Association) in 1908.78 As Schmid points out, the author Yŏ Kyu-hyang  
defended the use of Chinese characters based not on “claims about the special 
relationship between characters and knowledge” or on “the special transnational status of  
characters,” but rather based on their Korean origins.79 Yŏ dismissed the assertion that  
characters had “invaded” from abroad and instead claimed that they had been in Korea all  
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along, since the time of Tan’gun and Kija.  According to Schmid, this essay shows “how  
deeply the logic of nationalizing culture had penetrated intellectual circles by the early  
twentieth century….Even the embattled defenders of characters sought to frame their  
arguments in terms of nation and geographic origin.”80 However, I question whether the  
ideological leanings of the entire yangban class during a fifteen-year period (1895-1910)  
can be accurately judged based on a single essay.  I argue that the silence of the  
classically-educated literati speaks louder than a single, obscure editorial.  The absence of  
a concerted, public defense of the status quo (classical Chinese usage among the literati)  
reflects the apathetic attitude of this group to the language question.  Most of those fluent  
in hanmun would have been satisfied with its usage and felt little if any need to engage in  
the discourse on language reform.  The overwhelming majority of academic materials  
were still being published in classical Chinese or kukhanmun, while vernacular  
publications like The Independent and the Cheguk sinmun (Imperial Post, 1898-1910)  
were simply ignored or not taken as seriously by the ‘sophisticated’ scholar.81 Though  
Schmid and others have demonstrated that these and other vernacular publications may  
have enjoyed a wider readership than their circulation numbers suggest due to the  
practice of public reading, all those who understood the article did not necessarily  
possess the desire or literary ability to contribute a written response.82 Furthermore, the  
popular press was still a new phenomenon, and, much like any new technology, the  
newspaper may have simply escaped the notice of the older, more conservative yangban  
members.  The Han’gŭl movement also exploded so suddenly and with support from  
such a narrow segment of young, elite reformers that no one likely predicted that Chinese  
characters were in any imminent danger of extinction in Korea.  For all of these reasons,  
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defenders of the old Chosŏn vestige of pure hanmun were all but silent in the popular  
press, while reform-minded proponents of kukhanmun and kukmun continued their  
attempts at shaping the discourse on the language question up until the Japanese  


































Part 3. The Nation for Han’gŭl: National Consciousness 
 
         When Marquee Ito previously visited Korea, our foolish people said to each other: ‘Ito  
         Hirobumi is a man who wishes to mediate a peaceful triangular relationship in East Asia,       
         so surely this time he will present a plan for insuring the foundation of our country’s  
         independence.’  And so ministers and commoners from high and low lined up from the port  
         of Inch’ŏn all the way to Seoul to welcome him.  However, some things in this world are  
         difficult to comprehend.  What was the motive behind this unexpected fifth stipulation  
         (五 條 件, Protectorate Treaty)? This treaty signifies not only a schism between our two  
         countries but the dissolution of East Asian unity….Alas! What a regretful, sorrowful day!  
         Twenty million of our countrymen becoming the slaves of another—is this living or dying?  
         Four thousand years of national spirit from the time of Tangun and Kija, all destroyed over  
         night.  Oh, my countrymen, what lament!  What lament!1 
 
This essay appeared in the pages of the Hwangsŏng Sinmun (Capitol Gazette) on  
November 20, 1905.  Just three days earlier, the Protectorate Treaty between Japan and  
Korea had been finalized, effectively ending Korea’s full autonomy by removing its  
diplomatic authority and placing it under Japanese control.  This piece reveals the sense  
of betrayal felt by many Korean reformers upon hearing news of the Protectorate Treaty.   
The Hwangsŏng Sinmun, a moderate newspaper published in mixed Sino-Korean script  
and read mainly by the intellectual class, was committed to moderate causes and  
championed a gradual brand of reform in Korea.  Unlike the more radical nationalist  
tendencies of periodicals like Tongnip sinmun, the ideology of Hwangsŏng sinmun was  
pan-Asianist, and up until 1905, the authors of many editorials used Japan as a model in  
the promotion of causes like military, education, and language reform.  This ideology of 
pan-Asianism promoted a common Eastern cultural heritage and a new understanding of 
the Western notion of civilization and enlightenment, with Japan increasingly taking the 
lead role in the years after its defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War.  However, with 
the signing of this treaty any illusions of a “peaceful triangular relationship in East Asia”  
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were dispelled.  The pan-Asianist/nationalist debate, which had defined the parameters of  
the discourse on the emergent Korean nation in the enlightenment period, had been  
fundamentally altered.  As subsequent Japanese rhetoric would demonstrate, Japan had  
appropriated the ideology of munmyŏng kaehwa for its own modernizing agenda on the  
Korean peninsula, throwing the Korean reform movement into a state of ambiguity.  By  
1907, King Kojong had been forced to abdicate his thrown and Japan was ruling directly  
through its newly established Residency General in Korea.2 The remaining Korean army  
was disbanded, the press was brought under stricter control, and regulations requiring the  
introduction of pro-Japanese texts and curriculum into government and private schools  
were enforced.3 On August 16, 1910, Korea’s remaining autonomy was forfeited as King  
Sunjong was forced to affix his seal to a treaty of annexation.  A dynasty lasting more  




3.1. The Quiet Before the Storm, 1910-1919 
 
 
The Japanese take over of 1910 brought about drastic changes in nearly every aspect of 
Korean life, from education and language to economic and land reforms.  Never before 
had government authority penetrated Korean society so thoroughly.  In the process of  
establishing and solidifying the Government General of Korea (GGK), as the new  
colonial state came to be known, Japan managed in some way to anger or alienate  
virtually every segment of Korean society due to the oppressive nature of rule.  The  
period from 1910 to 1919 was defined by a heavy-handed bundan seiji (military rule).  
The most visible component of this bundan seiji were the feared military police, an  
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ubiquitous force on the streets of the colony responsible not only for regular police duties  
but also determination of punishment, covert surveillance, and torture.  A short list of  
grievances voiced by demonstrators under interrogation after participation in the March  
1919 Independence Movement will illustrate the nature of colonial rule during this first  
decade. 
     
     There is discrimination between Korean and Japanese officials. 
             The Japanese despise Koreans. 
             The Japanese tend to strike Koreans, regardless of cause. 
      There is no special treatment of the yangban and literati. 
      Government employment opportunity is limited to the extreme degree. 
      No Korean holds an important position in government. 
             Only Koreans are whipped (in legal cases). 
     Laws are too frequently issued and do not suit the standard of the people. 
     The encouragement of industry is mostly against the will of the people, and the  
      methods used are coercive. 
      There is too heavy a load of forced labor. 




Two of the changes most relevant to the Korean language situation were the  
transformations in the publishing industry and educational system.  Beginning in 1905,  
the Residency General tightened its grip on publication content on the peninsula until the  
press was completely coopted or disbanded by the GGK by 1910.5 All privately owned  
newspapers were shut down, and the widely circulated Korea Daily News (Taehan maeil  
sinbo), until that time able to publish anti-Japanese articles due to its foreign ownership,  
was purchased in a forced sale and turned into an organ paper for the GGK.6 The  
crackdown on the Korean press had a dramatic impact on the burgeoning publishing  
industry.  Lee Chong-sik claims that, “before annexation there were one or two 
newspapers in most of the cities, but all the Korean publishers were ordered to close their  
shops, and finally only one Japanese newspaper was allowed in each city.  These and any  
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remaining periodicals were forbidden to report matters relating to politics.”7 Many  
newspapers printed in Japan were also prohibited from being imported in Korea.  As a  
result of this blackout, there is a dearth of Korean-language writing during this period,  
especially that of a political nature.  Not only did this sever the growing discussion on 
the future of the nation in the popular press, but it silenced a forum which served as a  
laboratory for Han’gŭl refinement and standardization as well as a tool of literacization  
and Han’gŭl popularization.  Many progressive reformers also resigned in protest from  
their posts at these publications, forfeiting their voice in the reform movement.  Some  
periodicals did survive the crackdown, such as Ch’oe Nam-sŏn’s Youth (Ch’ŏngch’un,  
1914-1918), a magazine that attempted to pioneer new style vernacular prose and poetry.   
This periodical, however, was the exception, and this virtual black hole in the history of 
Korean literature is deserving of its moniker “dark period” (amhŭkki). 
     Another area undergoing drastic transformations and directly related to the Korean  
language question was education.  Since the 1894 Kabo Reforms, the Chosŏn  
government had been slowly laying the foundation for a modern educational system,  
directing “the publishing of new textbooks and training for elementary school teachers  
and arranging the schooling structure in terms of elementary-secondary-higher  
education”8 However, the government was hampered by a lack of revenue and political  
will, and so the most significant growth in modern education during this period occurred  
under the auspices of Western missionaries and private Korean citizens.  By some  
estimates there were about 2,000 such schools at the time of annexation, servicing  
approximately 200,000 students.9 The Education Ordinance of 1911 placed a number of  
regulations on these private schools and mandated the use of GGK-approved textbooks.   
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Many of the schools did not survive the new stipulations and pressure to close.  By 1920,  
the number of private, non-Japanese institutions dropped to 661, and their numbers  
continued to decrease until, in 1942, only 252 remained.10 At the same time, Japanese  
colonial schools for Koreans increased at an impressive rate initially, as many private 
schools unable or unwilling to conform to GGK standards were converted and 
immediately brought on line.  As of 1912 there were around 400 Japanese schools, both 
public and private.  By 1920 this number had climbed to over 800, and by 1942 all 
Japanese schools combined numbered just under 4,000.11  
     Despite this increase in modern schools, the demand for education among Koreans  
always outstripped supply, a situation exacerbated by the transformed nature of the  
Korean job market.  With the Education Ordinance of 1911, the national language of  
Korea became Japanese, while the Korean language was demoted to “indigenous  
language” or Chōsengo.  This meant that all Japanese school curricula were to be taught  
in the national language, with Chōsengo being reserved only for the initially compulsory  
but later optional Korean language class.  As the number of Japanese schools increased  
and private schools were closed or co-opted, the growing Korean hunger for modern  
education had fewer and fewer alternatives.  Added to this was the strengthened  
relationship between modern education and employment.  A growing swath of the  
colonial economy became predicated upon graduation from an accredited institution,  
ensuring that the demand for this modern education would continue to rise.  However, the  
Japanese public school system was segregated and unequal according to race; Koreans  
were provided a separate curriculum which stressed a moral and ‘practical’ education,  
while their Japanese counterparts were trained for higher schooling and/or top-level  
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jobs.12 Furthermore, the truncated Korean system (starting later and finishing earlier) and  
unbalanced emphasis on language education put those Koreans wishing to pursue higher  
education at a disadvantage, as they would be required to take additional schooling before  
being considered for admission.  This institutional structure contributed to the legitimiza- 
tion of Japanese as the national language while demoting Korean to a subordinate status 
reinforced by the habitus of ‘modernized’ Koreans.  The educational system also retarded 
the progress of nascent Han’gŭl popularization through the substitution of the 
disproportionately supported, legitimized language, Japanese. 
     Those Japanese involved in colonial policy justified these measures through recourse  
to munmyŏng kaehwa ideology, the same rhetoric that Korean reformers had utilized  
prior to annexation.  Terauchi Masatake, Korea’s last resident general, said the following  
of Korean civilization and its potential for assimilation to Japanese prior to annexation: 
 
          Koreans are on a different level from the Japanese and thus it is difficult to put them under  
           the same [educational] system right away.  After they learn the conditions, customs, and    
           mannerisms of the Japanese, after the welfare of the people is secured through   
           improvements in their level of culture, and after they develop the required knowledge,   
           gradually they can be assimilated as Japanese.13 
 
Just ten years prior, the early Korean Enlightenment thinker Yu Kil-jun had expressed  
similar sentiments in his influential travelogue/didactic tract, Things Seen and Heard in  
the West (Sŏyu Kyŏnmun, 1895).  Yu wrote the following on the extent of a society’s  
enlightenment:  
 
          The enlightened individual investigates and manages countless matters (samul), striving  
          daily for new knowledge.  For this reason, he possesses a refined and progressive nature  
          void of pettiness and indolence, and when meeting others he speaks courteously and     
          conducts himself with propriety. He imitates the skillful while pitying the incompetent, yet  
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          never does he exhibit vulgarity or display disparagement….The nation (kukmin) is a  
          group of these individuals working together to advance the cause of enlightenment.14 
 
Terauchi and Yu each describe their perception of an enlightened and civilized society,  
with particular attention being paid to mannerisms, behavior, and cultural level.  While  
Yu specifies the negative characteristics in conjunction with the positive, the negative  
traits of the unenlightened can be inferred through Terauchi’s speech, negative traits  
attributed to the not yet enlightened Koreans.  Both pieces stress the need for  
advancement of culture through exposure to and cultivation of civilized and enlightened  
behavior, but the difference between the audience and tone of each argument is  
significant.  Written at a time when Korea was just beginning to become exposed to  
foreign ideas, and when none had traveled extensively or studied abroad, Sŏyu kyŏnmun 
was a didactic work aimed at enlightening the Korean people and opening their eyes to 
the world around them.  Using a common technique of reform-intellectuals of the time, 
Yu describes a negative model in contrast to the ideal, insinuating that many Koreans still 
resemble this unenlightened model and therefore require cultural refinement.  Terauchi 
uses a similar technique, but rather than fixing ‘the Other’ as the positive model for 
change, he concludes that his own nation has already reached this level and therefore  
qualifies for this civilizing project.  More importantly, whereas Yu calls on “the nation”  
(kukmin) to work together to raise the level of Korean culture and “advance the cause of  
enlightenment,” Terauchi appropriates this same discourse not in the self-strengthening  
tone of Yu but as justification for colonization and assimilation.  Speaking on the Korean  
educational system, Terauchi’s calls on Koreans to “improve their level of culture” and  
“develop the required knowledge,” had clear implications for language; if Koreans  
wished to reach the cultural enlightenment of Japan, they had to learn the language of  
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Japan.  The distortion of this ideology for purposes of colonization and segregation  
revealed to many the double-edged sword that was munmyŏng kaehwa and prompted  
Korean reformers to rearticulate the ideological foundations of the nation and the role  
that language would play in it.  Japan’s colonial policies during the first decade of rule go  
far in explaining the direction and shape of the Korean nation in the 1920’s and its  




3.2. A New Direction? The Korean Language after March First 
 
 
Japanese policy in Korea during the first decade of colonial rule penetrated much more  
deeply into Korean society than the Chosŏn government ever had, affecting the lives of  
nearly every Korean in some way.  The increased contact with the colonial modernization  
paradigm in the form of mobilization, modern education, and circulation of new  
ideologies stimulated the intellectual class and engendered political consciousness.  At  
the same time, strict press control and limited or segregated education denied outlets of  
expression and stifled the urban intellectual elite.  Prohibition of assembly and intense  
surveillance also contributed to an atmosphere of animosity and tension in urban areas.   
However, Japan’s policies also affected the lower classes in new ways throughout the  
country.  The GGK’s cadastral survey and mass land reform, though beneficial to certain  
landlords, dispossessed many peasants of their livelihood and placed crushing burdens on  
the remaining tenants in the form of heavy taxation, debt, and the effects of volatile  
markets.  The violent Japanese pacification of peasant guerrilla bands, known as  
Ŭibyŏng (Righteous Armies), in 1905 and again from 1907 through 1911 further  
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awakened the lower classes to the brutality of Japanese rule.  Without a release valve, the  
pressure continued to build on the Korean peninsula until, in 1919, the release finally  
came in the form of mass demonstrations.  This mass movement, known as the 3.1 
Undong (The March First Movement), would have massive reverberations throughout the 
system and would compel the GGK to change course in its administration of the colony. 
     Most research on the 3.1 Undong characterizes the event as a mass nationalist  
movement organized mainly by moderate religious leadership (Christian, Ch’ŏndogyo,  
and Buddhist), broadly supported among diverse classes and women, and inspired by the  
Wilsonian ideal of self-determination.15 As the details of the 3.1 Undong have been well  
documented elsewhere, here I wish only to mention two points that relate to the Korean  
language and Han’gŭl.  First, the broad scope of the demonstrations signified the  
maturation of the Korean nationalist movement and reflected the influence of educational  
institutes, especially Christian, in spreading nationalist sentiment through vernacular  
education.  Since the 19th century, Protestantism had a stood as a pillar of Han’gŭl  
support in Korea, beginning with mass bible distribution campaigns and continuing  
through a legacy of private, vernacular education.16 Schools such as these were  
instrumental in amassing large groups of young people and organizing the 3.1 Undong  
thanks to the relative autonomy granted to religious organizations.  These Christian 
missionary schools possessed more curricular latitude than Korean private schools, and 
many school leaders were sympathetic to the nationalist cause.  Coupled with the 
accessibility and mass appeal of Han’gŭl/vernacular education, these institutions proved 
to be potent champions of independence among Korean youth.  The national 
consciousness bred in these schools represented the reconceived response to the colonial-
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modernization paradigm, and presaged the approach to language and Han’gŭl in the years 
to come. 
     Secondly, the 3.1 Undong caused the GGK to rethink its policy in Korea, bringing  
about a new type of colonial administration that came to be known as  bunka seiji 
(cultural policy).  One aspect of this cultural policy was a suspension of the media 
blackout and an expansion of the vernacular press.  The permit system which had been in 
place since 1910 was relaxed, and from 1920 to 1925 the number of permits issued 
tripled from 409 to 1,240.17 Two Korean vernacular newspapers—the Tonga ilbo (East 
Asia Daily) and the Chosŏn ilbo (Korea Daily)—were also issued permits in 1920 and, 
along with six magazines, were allowed to print material related to politics, social 
problems, and international events.  Although the most inflammatory material was 
censored, a flourishing of intellectual discourse erupted in the popular press during the 
1920’s.  These periodicals attracted many of the best and brightest young intellectuals, 
making the new vernacular press the center of Korean political and social life.  The 
growth in readership during the 1920’s was also impressive.  Unlike their pre-colonial 
predecessors The Independent and the Korea Daily News, whose circulation never 
surpassed a few thousand, combined circulation of the vernacular press reached 103,027 
by 1929.18 Han’gŭl, which had been virtually eliminated from public life during the 
previous decade, made a strong recovery through renewed circulation in the press and a 
broader base of support among more diverse groups of Koreans.  Literary journals 
continued the legacy of the recently defunct periodical Ch’ŏng Ch’un (Youth) by 
experimenting with new genres of vernacular literature, refining the language and 
exploring the parameters of Han’gŭl usage.      
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     Two issues that garnered significant attention amid the ‘press renaissance’ of the  
1920’s were education and language reform.  These issues came to be more intimately  
connected than during the pre-annexation debate, and opinions on the matter were voiced  
by a broader segment of Korean society.  The 3.1 Undong had demonstrated that  
Japanese influence would not be removed for the foreseeable future, at least not by force.   
Koreans would instead have to work within the colonial-modernization paradigm to  
improve their condition.  The primary means of self-improvement was education.  The  
previous decade had revealed the importance of modern education to social advancement,  
especially to ambitious Koreans who suddenly realized the necessity of accredited  
education (preferably Japanese) as they searched for work in the expanding colonial  
economy.  Though modern schools of all stripes were perpetually in demand, a Korean  
family theoretically had several educational options.  One option was missionary schools.   
However, these schools were almost always filled to capacity, and they operated under  
constant threat of being shuttered by the colonial authorities.  According to Michael  
Robinson, in the end, “mission schools continued to act principally as preparatory schools,  
and their graduates continued to seek admission to Japanese universities for higher level  
training.”19 Private Korean schools were another option, but they suffered from many of  
the same setbacks as missionary schools.  Though these schools were permitted to offer  
more upper level courses and professional degrees, competing with the lure of more  
prestigious Japanese schools or study in the metropole was difficult.  The area of  
expanding educational opportunity and accessibility was therefore the Japanese public  
school.  However, students attending these schools would encounter several deleterious  
effects, namely Japanese acculturation and indoctrination, native language loss,  
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simplified curricula, and segregation.  Because the vernacular press was not authorized to  
print articles on some of the more contentious above issues, many Korean reformers  
writing in these periodicals set their sights on language reform and public education,  
issues that gained widespread support across class, gender, and ideological predisposition,  
as well as initial tacit support from the GGK.20 
     Calls for Korean language reform escalated from the whispers of linguists and  
intellectuals from 1895-1910 to the shouts of the nation during the 1920’s.21 One of the  
most effective and enduring vehicles for Han’gŭl promotion and reform was The Han’gŭl  
Society (Han’gŭl hakhoe), whose stated purpose was to “research the precise laws and  
principles of the Korean language.”22 Founded in 1921 by students of Chu Si-kyŏng, this  
organization worked diligently to form a modern Korean orthography, compile a  
Comprehensive Korean dictionary (K’ŭn sajŏn), and lay the foundations of a modern,  
standardized Korean language.  Over a decade of efforts bore fruit in 1933 when the  
Unified Orthography (Match’umbŏp t’ongil’an) was published, the first appearance of  
an indigenous orthography.  In order to propagate their work, the organization worked  
closely with Korean publishers and newspapers, and urged Japanese education officials  
“to accept changes in Korean-language texts and to upgrade Korean language instruction  
in private and colonial schools,” with mixed results.23 Because the GGK passed its own  
‘official’ Korean orthographies (in 1912, 1921, and 1930) for use in Japanese public  
schools, the extent of influence exerted by the Han’gŭl Society on actual Japanese  
practice is not clear.24 However, the organization was clearly involved in grass-roots  
movements and enjoyed the support of various segments of Korean society.  According  
to Michael Robinson, in addition to the activities listed above, the Han’gŭl Society  
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“staged a series of training institutes for Korean instructors to elevate their teaching  
techniques…provided language instruction material to the growing student population of  
Christian schools…and began a successful series of circuit lectures in which members  
traveled to the provinces to report on research results and to promote the literacy  
movement.”25  
     While the Han’gul Society was attending to the linguistic research behind the  
language movement, as well as the legwork related to Han’gŭl/vernacular promotion,  
writers in the popular press were expressing their positions on the language question as  
well as their general feelings toward Korean.  An examination of these opinion pieces in  
academic journals and newspapers of the time may shed some light on the discourse  
surrounding the language movement and reveal more populist views on the matter.  One  
educator during the 1920’s by the name of Ryang Myŏng decried the state of Korean by  
pointing out some of the misconceptions held by foreigners: 
 
For the past four years I have been fielding some rather unpleasant questions from 
foreigners about the state of our language.  The first distressing question was, “Does 
Korea have its own writing (munja)? Would communication in this writing be possible 
without the support (him) of Chinese writing?”  They even inquired, “Is the Korean 
language really different from Japanese? Is not Japanese the current language of 
Korea?”26 
 
Ryang attributed these misconceptions to Koreans’ own “contemptuous treatment”  
(ch’ŏn dae  賤 待) of Korean writing.27 Specifically, he claimed that, “under the tyranny  
of Chinese writing, King Sejong’s chŏngŭm has suffered oppression worse than that of  
black slaves before the American Civil War.”28 For Ryang, a fundamental reform of  
Korean literature and writing was necessary to regain the heart and spirit of the Korean  
nation.  To that end, he proposed the following six goals:  
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            1. Write in the language of today. (hyŏnjae uri mal) 
 2. Limit Chinese characters. 
 3. Fix grammar rules. 
 4. Utilize punctuation and symbols. 
 5.  Do not just write for writing’s sake. 
 6. Translations are translations; Original works should be original.29 
 
Ryang’s first proposition represents a current in the Korean language movement which  
had been gaining traction since the late 19th century but received increasing attention with  
the demotion of classical Chinese and ascension of Han’gŭl, namely the unification of  
written and spoken language (ŏnmun ilch’i).  Early Korean reformers who had studied in  
Japan, such as The Independent founder Sŏ Chae P’il, were influenced by the Meiji-era  
ŏnmun ilch’i debates and carried the impetus for reform into the pages of the Korean  
press.  Though Ryang did not mention Japanese language reform, he did cite the Chinese  
New Literature Movement (新文學運 動) as a model for reform and a reason why Korea  
should follow suit in limiting or reforming so-called “dead writing” (samunja, 死文字) in  
favor of producing “living literature” (hwalmunhak, 活文學).30 The Han’gŭl hakhoe also  
promoted ŏnmun ilch’i for the sake of effective vernacular education and promulgated its  
usage in publications such as the Classified Compendium of Standard Korean in 1936.   
The second proposition was an ongoing discursive thread throughout the language  
movement since the late 19th century, a discussion that continued through the 1920’s and  
up until the present day.  In the debate over the use of Chinese characters (hanja), one  
extreme argued for the exclusive usage of Han’gŭl and the abolition of hanmun, while  
the other extreme revered pure hanmun and still denigrated Han’gŭl.  By the 1920’s,  
vocal support of the latter position had waned considerably, and Han’gŭl continued its  
ascendency in terms of proportion to hanmun and increased utilization in previously off- 
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limit academic writing.  However, most reformers conceded that pure-Han’gŭl usage was  
not yet feasible without script reform and ŏnmun ilch’i, so the above argument by Yang  
represented a majority consensus at the time.  Propositions four and five represent more  
practical steps toward linguistic refinement.  In his article, Ryang argued that such  
developments in language reform should not be confined to the “grammarians” (munbŏp  
chŏnmunka), but should be promulgated throughout “the general population” (ilban  
minjung), meaning most significantly Korean students through standardized vernacular  
education.31 Finally, proposition five urged writers to write not just for leisure, but with  
purpose and emotion, while point six referred to the apparent tendency among Korean  
writers to alter translations and plagiarize ostensibly ‘original’ work. 
     Many writing on the language issue after 1920 repeated the arguments of the first  
generation of language reformers from the 1890’s.  One article appearing in the academic  
journal Tongkwang (Eastern Light) criticized the names that had designated Han’gŭl in 
the past (vulgar script, ŏnmun) and proposed the fixing of a more venerable appellation.32  
Another contributor writing in 1935 reflected on the contempt that the Han’gŭl pioneer  
Chu Si-kyŏng must have endured from his peers for focusing on such a previously  
denigrated pursuit, then praised the work of Chu and stressed the significance of his  
research to the contemporary language movement.33 Other writers continued to reiterate  
the ease of learning Han’gŭl and the potential of practical application, as well as invoke  
Confucian reverence for the script inventor, King Sejong.  However, unlike the  
generalized, theoretical arguments for Han’gŭl usage based on civilization and  
enlightenment that characterized earlier discourse, authors increasingly proposed specific  
avenues for language/script reform and linked this issue to the improvement of modern  
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institutions such as public education.  In an article tellingly entitled “Decisive Action for  
Chŏngŭm Grammar: from Random Thoughts to a Solid Proposal,” a writer by the name  
of Yi Chu-man explained the crucial importance of language reform to Korean education  
and knowledge development through an interesting analogy: 
 
 
The purpose of a wind or water mill is to make white rice suitable for everyone’s 
comfortable living.  The purpose of compiling and unifying the knowledge of various 
academic subjects is to similarly bring happiness from the individual to the whole society.  
Therefore, we cannot forget the relationship between the individual and society, for if we 
disregard this indispensable connection, all the knowledge we take such pains to acquire 
will have no meaning.  We express our thoughts and feelings through forms called letters, 
namely, through writing.  This writing becomes the foundation of countless academic 
subjects and the seed of human culture.  Other than written language (sŏngmun, 成 文) 
there is spoken language, but this language varies over time and space and so is not as 
effective (in conveying knowledge).  Even with great knowledge, if speech and codified 
writing abilities are lacking, it is no different than strolling around at night in 
embroidered robes (ŭi su ya haeng, 衣 繡 夜 行).  Therefore, Korean students have an 
undeniable duty to their country, a destiny (inyŏn).  If we forsake Han’gŭl writing 
(chosŏnmun) and avoid researching it, we forget our destiny and our duty toward Korea, 




In this article, Yi stresses the crucial role of language in diffusing education to the entire  
society, creating a happy and comfortable lifestyle.  Unlike earlier calls for Han’gŭl  
promulgation based on advancing the concept of civilization, Yi points out the need for  
codified written language to unite the disparate areas of academic knowledge for the 
betterment of society.  Yi specifically targets Korean students, calling on them to perform 
their “duty” for the nation and fulfill their destiny.  Civilized and uncivilized races are not 
compared in a social-Darwinist framework that characterized so much previous discourse 
on the language question.  Rather, in a more refined tone the author calls for the 
unification of existing knowledge through vernacular education.  There is no need to 
attack traditional Confucian education while promoting modern education. By this point, 
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the nature of relevant knowledge (Chinese literature or ‘Western’ knowledge) is no 
longer the central topic of discourse, while the mode of knowledge attainment (hanmun 
or Han’gŭl) has decreased in importance from the previous generation.  Rather, the 
author calls for the “compiling and unifying” of all knowledge through a popularized, 
written Korean language for the betterment of society.  An explanation of who is meant 
by “students” would be superfluous; the author’s reference to “all kinds of academic 
subjects” and “written Korean” precludes traditional, Confucian education and students 
and clearly describes the next generation of students studying a ‘modern’ curriculum.    
      In their promotion of language standardization and literacy, a number of authors also  
conveyed a defensive tone.  As if feeling their culture under threat by outside forces,  
these authors expressed a sense of urgency in furthering the language movement.   
Though most articles do not explicitly mention Japan, reading between the lines belies  
the presence of ‘the other’ in opposition to the reform movement.  One magazine  
contributor named Pak P’al-yang writes the following on the unfortunate state of Korean  
culture in comparison to other nations: 
 
What does our country (Chosŏn) have to be proud of globally? When considering this 
question, we cannot help but feel distressed.  Today, having fallen behind others in every 
respect, do we have anything to be proud of?  The honest answer may well be, “Nothing 
at all.” However…I think that we should be proud of our writing (kŭl)… As we all know, 
Han’gŭl has been accorded an important status by scholars among world languages.  This 
gives us pride in the wisdom of our Han’gŭl inventors.  But instead of merely boasting of 
our ancestors’ accomplishments while failing to develop our own, we must work 
continually to establish our literature and culture and proudly show it to the world.35 
 
 
This excerpt reveals a self-conscious attitude toward the progress of Korean cultural  
development.  Having “fallen behind others in every respect,” Pak believes that Korea  
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must search for indigenous accomplishments to cultivate pride.  Furthermore, Koreans  
must not be content in resting on their laurels, but must “work continually to establish”  
Korean literature and culture and “show it to the world.”  Significantly, Pak does not  
limit his focus to promoting or even protecting writing and culture within Korea, but  
stresses presenting Korean culture proudly to the world.  This attempt to resurrect and  
promote indigenous cultural aspects was a common discursive method employed by  
Korean nationalist reformers representing a calculated response to the perceived threat of  
colonial cultural domination.  When Pak claimed that today (onŭlnal) Korean had fallen  
behind others in every respect, and that, considering this, “we cannot help but feel  
distressed,” this was a clear reference to the state of subjugation in which Korean found  
itself.  Many other authors during the 1920’s employed a similar rhetorical device.   
Among four articles with similar themes of expressing pride in things Korean, all four  
featured Han’gŭl prominently in their discussions.  The usage of the term ‘pride’  
(charang) in and of itself reflects the defensive nature of this discourse.  A secure,  
entrenched cultural asset would not have required explicit reference and calls for support,  
but would have rather prevailed without thought due to its unthreatened predominance.   
This is how Japanese was able to ascend to legitimate language without defensive  
rhetoric while Korean was allowed to continue as an academic subject.  By virtue of its  
near monopoly on labor market advancement backed by the colonial power structure,  
Japanese did not require or receive the explicit defense that Korean did, and its usage was  
not more forcefully implemented until Japan itself was threatened in the outbreak of  
World War II.   
     A prospectus issued by the Han’gŭl Society on the occasion of the 1929 Korean  
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Dictionary Compilation Conference (Chosŏnŏ sajŏn p’yŏnch’an hoe ŭi) expresses a  
similar sense of urgency relating to Korea’s position in world culture:        
 
 
Human happiness is promoted through the advancement of culture, and the development of 
culture is accelerated thanks to the rational reorganization and unification of language and 
writing……Every nation with any significant cultural development has long ago attended 
to speech and language reorganization and unification in an urgent manner.  Every civilized 
nation (munmyŏng minjok) in the past settled on standard spoken and written forms in order 
to establish a standardized overall language, and at the same time devised spoken/written 
unification through compilation of a standard dictionary…… Today, the shortcut to global 
rejuvenation for our straggling Korean nation is the urgent elevation and dissemination of 
our culture.  For expedient cultural promotion, we must rapidly plan the reorganization and 




Here, the Han’gŭl hakhoe echoes the sentiments of earlier Korean language pioneers.   
Language is linked to the cultural progress of a country, and the authors urge Korea to  
take immediate steps to advance the status of language, “the foundation of culture.”   
However, there are perceptible differences between this and earlier discourses on  
language.  Much like the article by Yi Chu-man cited above, the focal point for reform is  
no longer the demotion of classical Chinese and the promotion of pure Han’gŭl or even  
kukhanmun.  With the ascendancy of Han’gŭl and the dissipation in the importance of  
Chinese Confucian education a foregone conclusion, the focus has now shifted to the nuts  
and bolts of language reform: reorganization (chŏngni), unification (t’ong’il), and  
dictionary compilation.  The authors also stress the unification of language and writing,  
an issue that gained more attention as reform initiatives like this drew closer to specific  
policy action.  Furthermore, much like Pak’s article expressing pride in Han’gŭl, this  
prospectus conveys a sense of urgency in the language reform movement.  Again, though  
the colonial rulers are not explicitly cited, the intimation does not go without notice.  The  
authors repeatedly stress the speed or urgency of language reform, and the references to  
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the “straggling Korean nation” requiring a “shortcut to global rejuvenation” seem to  
describe a physical contest.  The standardization and unification of the Korean language  
was a race against time, and failure would mean irreparable damage to Korean culture  
and the nation.   
     Other writing on language during the 1920’s was not as cryptic on the issue of Japan.   
One article in the Tonga Ilbo (East Asia Daily) printed on the 481st anniversary of  
Han’gŭl’s promulgation entitled “The Meaning and Mission of the Han’gŭl Movement”  
drew a direct connection between the status of Japanese and the future of Han’gŭl,  
infusing the movement with a political immediacy.  The author claims that the advent of  
the “tenacious enemy” Japanese had made many “pessimistic about the future of the  
Korean language.”37 However, rather than feeling intimidated or pessimistic, this  
“struggle for existence” (saengjon kyŏngjaeng) between the languages would bring out  
Han’gŭl’s “innate ability” (naejaejŏk yŏkryang) and show people the political  
significance of the Han’gŭl Movement.  What was at stake in the “reorganization and  
propagation” of Han’gŭl was no less than “state authority” (kukkajŏk kwŏllyŏk).38 A more  
explicit argument for the importance of language in the cultural movement would  
probably not have even been published.  Here, the impetus for language reform originates  
not from appeals to civilization and enlightenment or efficacious modern education, but  
to nationalist struggle against the “tenacious enemy” embodied in a foreign, imposed  
language.  The tone of this article reflects a shift in the discourse on language reform  
among certain intellectual circles, from a reform movement for modernization against  
traditionalism, to a movement for survival against Japanese.  Had the press enjoyed more  
publishing freedom, more articles expressing similar sentiments would have undoubtedly  
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been written.  Today, we can only attempt to decipher veiled allusions and simply guess  
what lay behind the black marks of the censor.   
     One group in colonial Korea that received heightened attention after 1920 and who  
often bore the brunt of GGK censorship and harassment were the Socialists.  Following  
the Russian Revolution of 1919, Marxist ideology gained increasing currency among  
Korean intellectuals.  Michael Robinson has argued that the Korean language movement  
had mass appeal among these more radical elements due to the potential of mass  
literacization through Han’gŭl to create mass culture and class-consciousness.  One  
heavily censored article appearing in the journal Creation (Kaebyŏk) in 1924 expressed  
plainly the significance of language and education to the nation in Socialist terms: 
 
                           
We ask that the intellectual class (chisik kyekŭp) take on the task of educating the peasantry 
(nongmin).  Whatever urgent business there might be, the most pressing issue is the farmer 
education movement (nongmin kyoyuk undong).  Language, writing, folk tales, 
expressions—in every manner, they must be civilized and educated (kyohwa).  The most 
critical matter is the awakening of class-consciousness (kyekŭp ŭisik kaksŏng), followed by 




The article went on to criticize Japanese education and literature for indoctrinating  
Korean youth and fostering a “bourgeois society.”40 In order to educate the youth and  
working classes and roll back the influence of Japanese indoctrination, Socialists, along 
with some Christian and nationalist groups, supported summer literacy campaigns staged 
by university students with the cooperation of major nationalist papers beginning in 
1926.41 According to Robinson, this populist movement (pŭnarŏdŭ, Russ.: v narod [to the 
people]) was an attempt to involve directly the masses in nationalist consciousness 
raising and mass education.42  By Robinson’s account, the movement was relatively 
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successful due to the common bond of language that united the otherwise antagonistic 
cultural nationalist and Socialist camps.  While moderate elements emphasized the need 
for developing Korean culture to a higher level before the nation would be prepared for 
self-governance, more radical leftists argued for immediate independence through class-
consciousness and overthrow of the imperialist order.  However, each group happened to 
agree on the best means to achieve each end: education.  The most effective way to 
provide this education, regardless of content, was through vernacular Korean and 
Han’gŭl. 
     By the 1920’s, various segments of Korean society came to support the language  
movement for very specific reasons, and they couched their arguments in increasingly  
sophisticated terms.  A central goal in supporting language reform was the improvement  
and effective dissemination of modern education.  While many reformers reiterated the  
arguments of early Han’gŭl promoters (allegiance to king, ease of learning, civilization  
and enlightenment), the tone of the arguments and the methods invoked had changed  
since the 1890’s.  Although some repeated the munmyŏng kaehwa-phonetic script linkage,  
much discourse on language had shifted toward the promotion of more concrete  
proposals on language standardization, codification, and dictionary compilation.   
Organizations such as the Han’gŭl Society led such efforts on hard linguistic research and  
reform.  Other reformers writing in the popular press showed a protective nature toward  
Han’gŭl and Korean culture in general.  By resurrecting and protecting what they  
perceived to be genuinely Korean cultural assets, in thinly-veiled allusions to Japanese  
domination these writers attempted to counteract the degradation of current Korean  
culture that was “straggling,” and had “fallen behind others” and may well have “nothing  
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at all” to be proud of.43 Other more daring writers directly implicated the Japanese  
language and colonial policy in “indoctrinating” the youth and threatening the “future of  
Han’gŭl” and the Korean language.  Across the ideological divide, cultural nationalists  
and leftists alike agreed on the need for language reform, literacization and education for  
the future of a strong nation.  Despite the variation in tactics and tone, by the 1920’s  
Han’gŭl and vernacular education had amassed a broad coalition across gender, class, and  
ideology, and considerable gains were made in the language movement thanks to this  
consensus.  The language movement even enjoyed tacit approval from the colonial  




3.3. A Marriage of Convenience: The Language Movement and 
 
The Government General of Korea 
 
 
The post-Independence Movement world witnessed the emergence of a broad coalition  
supporting language reform, including educators, grammarians, linguists, and reformers,  
both radical and moderate.  The movement was also buttressed by the institutional  
authority of the GGK, a source of support at once disconcerting to many yet crucial to the  
cause of language reform.  Many of the most significant breakthroughs in Korean/ 
Han’gŭl reorganization and standardization, though initiated through grassroots efforts, 
actually came to be institutionalized by virtue of the GGK’s ultimate political authority.  
Although language organizations like the Han’gŭl Society worked tirelessly to fix 
standard orthography and compile a dictionary, it was actually the GGK that published 
the first modern orthographies of native Korean (in 1912, 1921, and 1930), as well as the 
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first standardized dictionary (1920).45 Because these publications were used in the 
predominant and constantly expanding Japanese educational system before indigenous 
standardization publications had been finalized, their influence on the linguistic 
inculcation of young Koreans was largely unchallenged.  This influence was more than 
just orthographical; the authority to write and promulgate a dictionary was an immense 
source of power.  As Ross King writes, according to Yi Ki-mun, in the unpublished 
proofs to the Japanese-published Korean dictionary, “all entries for Sino-Korean 
vocabulary that also existed as Sino-Japanese lexical items, but had meanings or usages 
different from those in Japanese, were systematically marked for exclusion in the final, 
published version of the dictionary.”46 Thus, even during the relatively supportive era of 
GGK research and publication and tacit support of Han’gŭl Society activities, there was 
an underlying current of discursive control and manipulation.   
     Though English language research on the history of Korean is limited, Korean  
language scholarship is plentiful.  This Korean language research has approached the  
relationship between the indigenous language reform movement and colonial authority in  
a variety of ways.  The original theoretical thread in Korean language history has  
characterized this relationship as one of antagonism, dominance, or outright violent  
suppression, a position dictated until the 1990’s by a South Korean intellectual  
environment of anti-Japanese sentiment, and in North Korea by a more blatant official  
state line pervading all research which continues to this day.  The official publication of  
the history of the Han’gŭl Society (Han’gŭl hakhoe 50nyŏnsa) for example focuses  
almost exclusively on the linguistic research of the organization, presenting these efforts  
as if they occurred almost in a vacuum.  This record does note the relatively freer  
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atmosphere that prevailed following the 3.1 Undong, but does not mention any sort of  
collaborative tendencies between the Han’gŭl Society and the GGK.47 On the contrary, a  
detailed treatment of Japanese influence in the language movement appears only in  
reference to the violent crackdown and subsequent trial in what came to be known as the  
Han’gŭl Society Incident (Chosŏnŏ hakhoe sunan sakŏn) of 1942.48 In a more recent  
work (1985) by Kim Yun-kyŏng, organization-based efforts in the language movement  
by groups such as the Han’gŭl Society are again accorded preeminent status, while  
effects of Japanese policy are cited only in connection to either increased freedom during  
bunka seiji or the draconian cultural obliteration (munhwa malsal) and forced  
assimilation of the total-war period.50 Therefore, these and other earlier works on the  
language question have characterized GGK authority in two very general ways: passive  
authority, in which a sort of tacit consent allows certain activities to proceed within limits,  
and active authority, in which undesirable projects are actively suppressed.  Other authors  
have acknowledged a more active role for the colonial authority in language reform, but  
have problematized the cultural nationalist response to these GGK overtures and  
negatively characterized the nature of this colonial intervention.  For example, Kim Ch’ŏl  
(2004) claims that GGK intervention into the language movement (in the form of  
orthography and dictionary publication) was a means of dividing (bunjŏl) and coopting  
the influential Han’gŭl Society, while ‘collaboration’ by certain cultural nationalists  
compromised the nationalistic credentials of the Han’gŭl Society and necessitated the  
mythicization of the resistance movement in post-colonial Korea.51   
     According to the above research, the GGK made few if any positive contributions to  
the Korean language movement, and the intervention that did take place was of a rather  
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cynical nature, designed to “divide and coopt.”  On the other extreme of the ideological  
spectrum, a number of Japanese so-called ‘historical revisionists’ have attempted to  
reinterpret the Japanese intervention into Korean language in a more positive light.  One  
author, ignoring the efforts of countless Korean reformers working in a constrained  
environment, wonders “if contemporary Koreans realize that the Ilbon ch’ongdokbu  
(GGK) was the first to propagate Han’gŭl and introduce it into elementary schools.”52  
Another author argues that “Han’gŭl was taught to the whole Korean nation (on kukmin)  
only after annexation,” and that, “because Han’gŭl orthography was so convoluted and  
had not been systematized throughout history, from 1911 the GGK assembled a joint  
Korea-Japan conference of scholars to advance research and promulgation [of  
Han’gŭl]”53 These descriptions of the Japanese role in the Korean language movement  
contain glaring omissions and make gross generalizations about GGK intent and the  
extent and nature of colonial education.  A nascent public school system was being  
established prior to annexation, and Han’gŭl (though not yet standardized) was being  
instituted in these schools.  Religious schools further employed Han’gŭl prior to Japanese  
arrival, bolstered by the propagative force of the vernacular bible.  Furthermore, the GGK  
was not responsible for teaching “the whole Korean nation” (on kukmin) Han’gŭl.  The  
primary means of disseminating Han’gŭl—the school—was still restricted to a minority  
of Koreans, and the Han’gŭl that was taught was limited to two hours a week through the  
unbalanced educational system that the GGK itself instituted.  Finally, the Spoken  
Language Orthography Conference (Ŏnmun ch’ŏljabŏp yŏnguhoe) organized by the  
GGK was hardly inclusive, and it is not clear whether the conference’s intentions were all  
that constructive.  Between passive authority, active authority, and spurious historical  
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revisionism, there must be an alternative approach to the language movement-colonial  
authority dynamic.   
     Some recent scholarship on the colonial-era Korean language movement has presented  
a nuanced perception of this dynamic.  For example, Yi Hye-ryŏng contends that “the  
relationship between colonial authority (GGK) and the Han’gŭl Movement was not  
always characterized by hostility.  Rather, “the absolute administrative power of the GGK  
demonstrated by the Korean Orthography Reform Law (Ŏnmun ch’ŏljabŏp ŭi kaejŏng)  
upon which every level of school textbook was based justified the actual authority of the  
GGK as a reference in the (subsequent) unification of Korean (Chosŏnŏmun t’ong’il).”54                            
This sort of deference to the linguistic authority of the GGK was not necessarily “pro- 
Japanese” (ch’iniljŏk) or some type of “illicit union” (yahap).55 More precisely, the  
Han’gŭl movement members and other cultural nationalists to some degree approved of  
“the modern nation-state system,” that Japan represented, but wanted to direct their own  
course as to the “what and how” of the system.56 The so-called ‘collaboration’ with the  
GGK through reference to existing language policy reflected a desire to control to some  
extent the means of modernization (in this case language reform) while working within  
the overall, generally accepted nation-state paradigm.  Takashi Matsui takes a similar  
approach to the language movement-GGK relationship, describing it as more interactive  
and periodically collaborative.  Takashi claims that the GGK attempted to harness the  
societal and pedagogical influence of the Han’gŭl Society to further its own policy of  
Japan-Korea Harmonization (Naesŏn yunghwa, 內鮮融和).57 An example of such an  
overture to the cultural nationalist camp can be found in the following speech by                 
Department of Education superintendent Matsura (Massŭura, 마쓰우라) during  
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deliberations for spelling reform publication.  In order to receive input from Korean  
language experts prior to the publication of the 1930 orthography, the GGK had  
convened this discussion:       
 
 
It goes without saying that, as a nation’s culture progresses its language also changes, and 
so orthography must be improved to reflect this.  Therefore, in this civilized empire 
(munmyŏng cheguk) we shall meet the demands of changing times and scientific principles 
to improve Korean’s orthographic expressions to conform to the application of the people 
(kukmin)…… I believe that appropriately adjusting and standardizing ŏnmun spelling 
under these circumstances, in terms of ŏnmun propagation, development, and Korean 
cultural representation, is of momentous importance……I anticipate that the public will 
find this to be an appropriate orthographical proposal, that it will become common use, and 




The convening of these deliberations demonstrates that the GGK paid at least lip service  
to the idea of inclusion and Japan-Korea harmony.  This speech also illustrates that Japan  
realized the need for language reform as well as its importance to the modernizing state.   
Furthermore, Matsura expresses a desire on behalf of the GGK to not only “adjust and  
standardize” the Korean language, but to “propagate and develop” Korean for the sake of  
“cultural representation.”  Matsura’s rhetoric represents a strong mandate for Korean  
standardization and propagation, originating from an unlikely source which has often  
been disparaged or ignored in past scholarship.  Yi and Takashi’s approaches to colonial  
language reform open new avenues in evaluating the cultural-nationalist/GGK  
relationship from a more interactionist perspective. However, a number of questions  
remain.  What were the actual motivations of the colonial authority in promoting Korean  
language reform?  To what extent were GGK language policies successful in promoting  
either Korean or Japanese goals?  What would happen when tacit or active support of the  
language movement shifted to active suppression? 
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3.4. Habitus and the Power of Legitimized Languages 
 
Though the approaches of Yi and Takashi are helpful in understanding the complex  
relationship between cultural nationalist reformers and colonial authority, they do not tell  
the whole story.  Evidence suggests that there did exist an overlapping area of positive,  
albeit uneasy cooperation between these two groups.  However, based on the overall  
system of control enacted by the colonial authority, we must question the underlying 
intentions of GGK intervention in the language movement.  A cynical analysis may  
reveal that a systematized, standardized Korean language would make the task of press  
censorship more manageable, while controlling manner of speech/writing unification in  
the public schools would allow Japan to manage the indoctrinated youth on its own terms.   
The manipulation of dictionary compilation cited above also reveals more sinister  
assimilationist objectives.  The fact that Korean language as a school subject was  
instituted from elementary school and gradually phased out before being completely  
dropped from the system in 1939 suggests that Korean was merely a stop gap measure to  
smooth the transition between illiteracy and Japanese acculturation.  What is clear is that  
the GGK support of Korean in Japanese public schools was never enthusiastic.  The  
following quote from an educator at Kyŏngsŏng High School illustrates the frustration  
with schizophrenic Japanese education policy related to Korean language education:        
 
Here is something that I find difficult to understand.  Why is it that the educational 
authorities (hakmu tangkuk) treat the only compulsory subject—Korean language—as they 
would an unwanted stepchild, or else with an ambivalent attitude……If they essentially 
disavow the need for the Korean language then they should say so, but because they have 
publicly acknowledged the necessity of Korean and have invested so much time by 
instituting it as a compulsory subject, then they must direct its development and work to 
satisfy the expectations surrounding it.59 
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This rhetorical divide between official GGK policy and actual implementation  
characterized much Japanese colonial discourse and resulted in a fitful approach to  
assimilation in schools and language policy in general.  However, on a deeper level, we  
must question the fundamental nature of the so-called assimilationist policy and the  
overall colonial education system.  Was the Japanese objective really to assimilate Korea  
as part of the Japanese empire, or rather, did the system operate through processes of  
social reproduction naturally enforced through underlying control of the legitimate  
language?  Much research has focused on the ‘failure’ of assimilationist policy due to  
rhetorical/implementational divide cited above as if the ‘success’ of such a policy was a  
desirable outcome.  Though this divide was apparent, I argue that the intrinsic goal of the  
system was never actually assimilation, but instead the pacification and control of the  
colony by any means necessary.  It happened that the most effective means of control  
were imbedded in the largely subconscious process of social reproduction through  
acculturation in Japanese schools.  Because these schools held a virtual monopoly on the  
labor market of the colonial economy, the GGK did not need to implement draconian  
policies of forced linguistic and cultural assimilation.  Rather, the system itself  
represented a self-reinforcing mode of power; upwardly mobile Koreans would naturally  
learn the legitimate language (Japanese) to function in the restricted labor market, being  
compelled by the forces of habitus.  The gradual deculturation of these same individuals  
in Korean language and culture was precipitated by the relative lack of reinforcing 
Korean language materials and the gradual diminution of missionary schools and Korean  
private schools.  Being an inculcated force acquired early in life, young Korean students  
were especially susceptible to the effects of habitus.  Those Koreans not attending  
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Japanese public schools had little chance of linguistic capital acquisition and social  
advancement, and therefore could do little to advance the language movement cause.   
The early reformers in the language movement were not the product of Japanese  
education but were instead inculcated in the legitimate language of classical Chinese and  
recognized as such.  It was through this acknowledged mastery of the legitimate language  
that these reformers gained the linguistic capital to be able to enact reform through  
strategies of condescension.  Looking at post-liberation South Korea, the fact that a  
majority of the leadership class retained had been expected of some form of Japanese  
collaboration illustrates the extent to which Japanese acculturation reinforced by habitus  
had reached.  A suitable class of Koreans understanding modern state-craft simply could  
not be found among a generation brought up in the restricted labor market connected to  
limited legitimized-language proficiency. 
     This is not to argue that the Korean language movement and Han’gŭl promotion by 
cultural nationalists was completely unsuccessful.  As I have demonstrated, the language 
movement realized significant gains during the colonial period thanks to the coalescing of 
a broad coalition of educators, linguists, Christians, cultural nationalists, and Socialists.  
However, we must question the meaning of the word ‘success.’ Can a language ever 
really be ‘successful’ in a system that delegitimizes it?  Can this lack of legitimacy ever 
be overcome when social reproduction of classes is predicated upon the preeminence and 
continued promotion of an opposing language?  The security of the Korean language and 
Han’gŭl was never really assured, and the eventual suspension of Korean usage in 
bureaucracy (1937), schools (1938) and the press (1939) attest to this fact.60 However, I 
argue that, from a policy perspective, this forced assimilation of the late 1930’s was not 
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only unnecessary, but may have actually been counterproductive.  Today, it is these harsh 
years of ‘total war’ that are most often cited as examples of Japanese cruelty and are most 
deeply etched in the collective Korean psyche.  They engendered han among many 
Koreans, a latent form of resentment, bitterness, and unresolved animosity which erupted 
in the post-liberation generation and continues in many respects today.  One example of 
resolved han took the form of mass Han’gŭl literacization in post-liberation North and 
South Korea.  What had not been realized for five hundred years of Han’gŭl history was 
achieved in North Korea in just a few years, while the South, though lagging in this 
respect, closed the literacy gap in a fraction of time compared with the gains of the 
colonial period.61 Therefore, despite the broad coalition supporting language reform, it 
was not until the systemic habitus inculcated through colonial education and reinforced 
through social reproduction caused by legitimate language ability was eliminated that the 
Korean language truly regained its security and legitimacy and can be said to have 
‘succeeded.’ Had Japan not initiated its so-called ‘cultural obliteration’ policies, it is 
unlikely that Koreans today would be quite so nationalistic about their language, though 
the language would have eventually ascended to legitimate status due to its post-
liberation implementation in universal education and in turn labor market ascendancy.  
On the other hand, had Japan emerged victorious in World War II, although the colony 
would have eventually come to an end much as European African colonies did, I believe 
that the Korean language situation would more closely resemble the tenuous position of 
other post-colonial languages, where the colonial language (i.e. English) retains a 
position of legitimacy in official functions while the indigenous language is reserved for 




Though one of the newest scripts in the global linguistic canon, Han’gŭl has experienced  
a long, tumultuous journey to the present day.  Throughout its history, the script has been  
variably promoted and oppressed, championed and disparaged for countless reasons,  
based on a variety of ideologies.  Upon promulgation of the script, Han’gŭl inventor King  
Sejong expressed his desire to help the illiterate people by providing a means of  
communication and expression.  Late 19th and early 20th century progressive intellectuals  
would invoke the benevolence of the King in their own promotion of the script, based on  
a neo-Confucian deference to authority.  More importantly, these reformers questioned  
the existence of an exclusive link between Chinese literature and relevant knowledge, and  
in so doing problematized the foundation of the pre-modern, East Asian epistemology.   
These calls for script reform were couched in the modern ideology of munmyŏng kaehwa,  
where the use of phonetic script was associated with higher levels of enlightenment and  
promoted as the panacea for effective new knowledge (sinhak) acquisition.  The Japanese  
colonial paradigm engendered a shift in the discourse on Korean and caused a  
transformation in tactics of reform.  While most Korean intellectuals acknowledged the  
need for modern education, the expansion of colonial education coupled with the  
diminution of more autonomous indigenous alternatives pressured many reformers to  
adapt their reform strategies to negotiate within the colonial system.  Discussion on the  
language issue shifted from questions of epistemology (traditional vs. modern) to more  
concrete issues such as language standardization and promulgation in the press and in  
schools.  The presence of colonial authority was enigmatic; while its early influence in 
language policy (published orthographies and dictionaries) and ultimate institutional 
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authority represented a model for reform and possible cooperation, its unbalanced 
education policies and perceived status as enemy precluded more fruitful collaboration 
with many Korean reformers.  Authors in the popular press responded to colonial policy 
with a sense of urgency relating to the language question.  While some encouraged pride 
in indigenous cultural assets and the rapid reform of Korean for the sake of “a straggling 
nation,” other reformers made more explicit references to Korean in opposition to the 
“tenacious enemy” from without, Japanese.  Liberation in 1945 freed the nation to follow 
its own approach to the language question, this time in an atmosphere very different from 
the pre-colonial environment.               
     The Korean language movement, though not successful in securing the ultimate  
liberation of Korean/Han’gŭl, did succeed in protecting the language from obliteration.   
Beginning with the benevolence of a king, the Korean script was utilized to varying 
degrees by certain groups of Koreans and played a part in the enjoyment of poetry and 
other literature for centuries until its utility and beauty were recognized in the modern era.  
A new generation of reformers protected Han’gŭl from the degradation of the yangban 
and the tyranny of the legitimized classical Chinese by promoting its usage for the 
acquisition of new knowledge beneficial to the establishment of a modern state.  With the 
commencement of colonialism, a reconceived language movement promoted the 
language and script, this time in opposition to the influence of the newly legitimized 
language, Japanese.  In all cases, reform-minded individuals were able to protect Korean, 
but the real influence of the language could not be realized until the system that perpetua- 
ted its inferiority was fundamentally altered.  While many Chosŏn authors used Han’gŭl 
for centuries in various literary genres, the script did not gain any official recognition or 
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traction among intellectuals until the time was right for the supplanting of classical 
Chinese as legitimized language in the early 20th century.  Similarly, though the colonial 
language movement defended Han’gŭl/Korean and made important strides in 
standardization and promulgation, only after regaining sovereignty could Korean realize 
full legitimacy and a secure future. 
     The story, of course, does not end there.  The Koreas today face new challenges rela-  
ted to the language question.  The use of Chinese characters in Korean education, though 
greatly reduced since 1945, remains a contentious issue among South Korean education 
policy makers, and the rising influence of China has renewed interest in the Chinese 
language.  While North Korea has suspended all usage of characters according to official 
policy, other linguistic measures have drastically altered the nature of Northern language 
in other ways that may drive a growing wedge between the two countries that does not 
bode well for the future of unification.62 Furthermore, the battle between legitimate and 
subordinate languages rages on in South Korea, perhaps with more dire consequences 
than during the colonial period.  The spread of globalization has heralded the dawn of 
global languages, and so the new legitimate language in opposition to Korean is 
increasingly perceived as English.  Much like Japanese during colonialism, English 
proficiency has become the gatekeeper to social advancement in the job market.  Families 
pay exorbitant amounts of money to ensure this proficiency for their children, and those 
unable to do so are increasingly limited in job opportunities.  In this way, social classes 
are reproduced from generation to generation, a situation all the more insidious because 
people believe that to learn or disregard English is a free choice.  As Bourdieu would say, 
the most effective form of power is that which people do not realize they are subject.                                      
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NOTES Part 1 
 
1. Hunminchŏngŭm (訓民正音) was the original name given to the Korean script 
upon promulgation in the mid 15th century by King Sejong of the Chosŏn Dynasty.  
It can be roughly translated as ‘Correct Sounds for the Instruction of the People.’ 
Following its promulgation, the script was often referred to by a shortened term, 
‘correct sounds’ (chŏngŭm), though today it is almost universally known as 
‘Han’gŭl.’ 
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section 1.2. 
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that use the language. Kim, Chu-wŏn. (LEAD) “Indonesian Tribe Picks Korean 
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19. Hanja are Chinese characters as they are used in grammatically and syntactically 
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still employ hanja (as in Sino-Korean mixed script), while hanmun relates to 
standard, classical Chinese as it was used in Korea, having very little resemblance 
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along socio-economic division lines, as evidenced by the exclusive elite usage of 
literary Chinese versus popular usage of colloquial language/Han’gŭl.  
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